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DIGITAL SPEECH AND DEMOCRATIC 
CULTURE:  A THEORY OF FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION FOR THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 
JACK M. BALKIN∗ 
In this essay, Professor Balkin argues that digital technologies alter the social 
conditions of speech and therefore should change the focus of free speech theory, from 
a Meiklejohnian or republican concern with protecting democratic process and 
democratic deliberation, to a larger concern with protecting and promoting a 
democratic culture.  A democratic culture is a culture in which individuals have a fair 
opportunity to participate in the forms of meaning-making that constitute them as 
individuals.  Democratic culture is about individual liberty as well as collective self-
governance; it concerns each individual's ability to participate in the production and 
distribution of culture.  Balkin argues that Meiklejohn and his followers were 
influenced by the social conditions of speech produced by the rise of mass media in the 
twentieth century, in which only a relative few could broadcast to large numbers of 
people.  Republican or progressivist theories of free speech also tend to downplay the 
importance of nonpolitical expression, popular culture, and individual liberty. The 
limitations of this approach have become increasingly apparent in the age of the 
Internet. 
 
By changing the social conditions of speech, digital technologies lead to new social 
conflicts over the ownership and control of informational capital.  The free speech 
principle is the battleground over many of these conflicts.  For example, media 
companies have interpreted the free speech principle broadly to combat regulation of 
digital networks and narrowly in order to protect and extend their intellectual property 
rights.  The digital age greatly expands the possibilities for individual participation in 
the growth and spread of culture, and thus greatly expands the possibilities for the 
realization of a truly democratic culture.  But the same technologies also produce new 
methods of control that can limit democratic cultural participation.  Therefore, free 
speech values—interactivity, mass participation, and the ability to modify and 
transform culture—must be protected through technological design and through 
administrative and legislative regulation of technology, as well as through the more 
traditional method of judicial creation and recognition of constitutional rights.  
Increasingly, freedom of speech will depend on the design of the technological 
infrastructure that supports the system of free expression and secures widespread 
democratic participation.  Institutional limitations of courts will prevent them from 
reaching the most important questions about how that infrastructure is designed and 
implemented.  Safeguarding freedom of speech will thus increasingly fall to 
legislatures, administrative agencies, and technologists. 
INTRODUCTION:  NOVELTY AND SALIENCE 
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What do digital technologies teach us about the nature of freedom of 
speech?  How should our theories of freedom of expression change to take 
these technologies into account?  In this essay, I argue that the Internet and 
digital technologies help us look at freedom of speech from a different 
perspective.  That is not because digital technologies fundamentally change 
what freedom of speech is.  Rather, it is because digital technologies 
change the social conditions in which people speak, and by changing the 
social conditions of speech, they bring to light features of freedom of 
speech that have always existed in the background but now become 
foregrounded. 
This effect—making more central and visible what was already 
always present to some degree—is important in any study of the Internet 
and digital technologies.  In studying the Internet, to ask “What is 
genuinely new here?” is to ask the wrong question.  If we assume that a 
technological development is important to law only if it creates something 
utterly new, and we can find analogues in the past—as we always can—we 
are likely to conclude that because the development is not new, it changes 
nothing important.1  That is the wrong way to think about technological 
change and public policy, and in particular, it is the wrong way to think 
about the Internet and digital technologies. 
Instead of focusing on novelty, we should focus on salience.  What 
elements of the social world does a new technology make particularly 
salient that went relatively unnoticed before?  What features of human 
activity or of the human condition does a technological change foreground, 
emphasize, or problematize?  And what are the consequences for human 
freedom of making this aspect more important, more pervasive, or more 
central than it was before? 
The digital revolution places freedom of speech in a new light, just as 
the development of broadcast technologies of radio and television did 
before it.  The digital revolution brings features of the system of free 
expression to the forefront of our concern, reminding us of things about 
freedom of expression that were always the case, but now have become 
more central and thus more relevant to the policy issues we currently face.  
The digital revolution makes possible widespread cultural participation and 
interaction that previously could not have existed on the same scale.  At the 
same time, it creates new opportunities for limiting and controlling those 
forms of cultural participation and interaction.  The digital age makes the 
 
 1 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 207, 216 (arguing that clear rules, property rights, and facilitating bargains will resolve 
regulatory problems in cyberspace much as they do in real space); Joseph H. Sommer, Against 
Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1145, 1148 (2000) (“[F]ew of the legal issues posed by the 
new informatics technologies are novel.”). 
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production and distribution of information a key source of wealth.  
Therefore it creates a new set of conflicts over capital and property rights 
that concern who has the right to distribute and gain access to information.  
Not surprisingly, the free speech principle sits at the center of these 
conflicts.  Freedom of speech is rapidly becoming the key site for struggles 
over the legal and constitutional protection of capital in the information 
age, and these conflicts will shape the legal definition of freedom of 
speech.  The digital revolution offers unprecedented opportunities for 
creating a vibrant system of free expression.  But it also presents new 
dangers for freedom of speech, dangers that will be realized unless we 
accommodate ourselves properly to the changes the digital age brings in its 
wake.  The emerging conflicts over capital and property are very real.  If 
they are resolved in the wrong way, they will greatly erode the system of 
free expression and undermine much of the promise of the digital age for 
the realization of a truly participatory culture. 
Digital technologies highlight the cultural and participatory features of 
freedom of expression.  In this essay, I offer a theory of freedom of speech 
that takes these features into account.  The purpose of freedom of speech, I 
shall argue, is to promote a democratic culture.  A democratic culture is 
more than representative institutions of democracy, and it is more than 
deliberation about public issues.  Rather, a democratic culture is a culture 
in which individuals have a fair opportunity to participate in the forms of 
meaning making that constitute them as individuals.2  Democratic culture is 
about individual liberty as well as collective self-governance; it is about 
each individual’s ability to participate in the production and distribution of 
culture. 
Freedom of speech allows ordinary people to participate freely in the 
spread of ideas and in the creation of meanings that, in turn, help constitute 
them as persons.  A democratic culture is democratic in the sense that 
everyone—not just political, economic, or cultural elites—has a fair chance 
to participate in the production of culture, and in the development of the 
ideas and meanings that constitute them and the communities and 
 
 2 See J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE L.J. 
1935, 1948–49 (1995) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE 
SPEECH (1993), and defining democratic culture as popular participation in culture). 
Media and popular culture theorist John Fiske has coined the term “semiotic democracy” to 
describe popular participation in the creation of meanings, often by turning existing forms of 
mass culture to different uses.  JOHN FISKE, TELEVISION CULTURE 236–39 (1987); see also 
Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image:  Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 
CAL. L. REV. 125, 146 (1993) (defining semiotic democracy as “a society in which all persons 
are free and able to participate actively, if not equally, in the generation and circulation of 
meanings and values”). Fiske’s idea has become particularly important in the intellectual property 
literature.  See infra note 56. 
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subcommunities to which they belong.3  People have a say in the 
development of these ideas and meanings because they are able to 
participate in their creation, growth, and spread. 
Like democracy itself, democratic culture exists in different societies 
in varying degrees; it is also an ideal toward which a society might strive.  
Freedom of expression protects the ability of individuals to participate in 
the culture in which they live and promotes the development of a culture 
that is more democratic and participatory. 
Freedom of speech is interactive and appropriative.  It is interactive 
because speech is about speakers and listeners, who in turn become 
speakers themselves.  Speech occurs between people or groups of people; 
individual speech acts are part of a larger, continuous circulation.  People 
participate in culture by interacting with others and influencing and 
affecting them through communication.  This is obvious in the case of 
speech directed at persuasion, but is true of all speech.  Even when we 
dislike what someone else is saying, we are often affected and influenced 
by it.  Our exposure to speech, our attempt to understand it, to bring it 
within our understanding, continually reshapes us.  Our continuous 
participation in cultural communication, our agreement with and reaction to 
what we experience, our assimilation and rejection of what culture offers 
us, makes us the sort of people that we are. 
Freedom of speech is appropriative because it draws on existing 
cultural resources; it builds on cultural materials that lay to hand.  
Dissenters draw on what they dislike in order to criticize it; artists borrow 
from previous examples and build on artistic conventions; even casual 
conversation draws on common topics and expressions.  People participate 
in culture through building on what they find in culture and innovating with 
it, modifying it, and turning it to their purposes.  Freedom of speech is the 
ability to do that.  In a democratic culture people are free to appropriate 
elements of culture that lay to hand, criticize them, build upon them, and 
create something new that is added to the mix of culture and its resources. 
The idea of a democratic culture captures the inherent duality of 
freedom of speech:  Although freedom of speech is deeply individual, it is 
at the same time deeply collective because it is deeply cultural.  Freedom of 
speech is, in Thomas Emerson’s words, a system.4  It is a cultural system as 
well as a political system.  It is a network of people interacting with each 
other, agreeing and disagreeing, gossiping and shaming, criticizing and 
parodying, imitating and innovating, supporting and praising.  People 
exercise their freedom by participating in this system:  They participate by 
interacting with others and by making new meanings and new ideas out of 
 
 3 Balkin, supra note 2, at 1948–49. 
 4 THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 3 (1970). 
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old ones.  Even when people repeat what others have said, their reiteration 
often carries an alteration in meaning or context.5  As people express 
themselves, make music, create works of art, sing, gossip, converse, 
accuse, deny, complain, celebrate, enthuse, boast, and parody, they 
continually add something to the cultural mixture in which they live.  They 
reshape, however imperceptibly, cultural conventions about what things 
mean, what is proper and improper, what is important and less important, 
how things are done and how they are not done.  Through communicative 
interaction, through expression, through exchange, individual people 
become the architects of their culture, building on what others did before 
them and shaping the world that will shape them and those who follow 
them.  And through this practice of interaction and appropriation, they 
exercise their freedom. 
Freedom of speech is thus both individual and cultural.  It is the ability 
to participate in an ongoing system of culture creation through the various 
methods and technologies of expression that exist at any particular point in 
time.  Freedom of speech is valuable because it protects important aspects 
of our ability to participate in the system of culture creation.  Participation 
in culture is important because we are made of culture; the right to 
participate in culture is valuable because it lets us have a say in the forces 
that shape the world we live in and make us who we are. 
The digital age provides a technological infrastructure that greatly 
expands the possibilities for individual participation in the growth and 
spread of culture and thus greatly expands the possibilities for the 
realization of a truly democratic culture.  But the same technologies also 
can produce new methods of control that can limit democratic cultural 
participation.  Therefore, free speech values—interactivity, mass 
participation, and the ability to modify and transform culture—must be 
protected through technological design and through administrative and 
legislative regulation of technology, as well as through the more traditional 
method of judicial creation and recognition of constitutional rights.  
Increasingly, freedom of speech will depend on the design of the 
technological infrastructure that supports the system of free expression and 
secures widespread democratic participation.  Institutional limitations of 
 
 5 Cf. Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc a b c  . . ., in 2 GLYPH 162, 200 (1977) (“Iterability 
alters[.]”).  Jed Rubenfeld expresses a similar idea through the metaphor of imagination.  He 
argues that freedom of speech protects the rights of both authors and readers because acts of 
imagination are inevitably transformative, both for producers and receivers of cultural objects.  
Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination:  Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 
37–38 (2002).  Rebecca Tushnet points out that repetition of ideas or social scripts can be a way 
of expressing solidarity with others, support for a favored cause, or one’s own sense of propriety 
as a member of a religious, political, or social group.  Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for 
Free Speech Law:  What Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign 
Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2001). 
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courts will prevent them from reaching the most important questions about 
how that infrastructure is designed and implemented.  Safeguarding 
freedom of speech will increasingly fall to legislatures, administrative 
agencies, and technologists.  Protecting freedom of speech in the digital age 
will require a new class of cyberlawyers, who understand the impact of 
technological design on free speech values and can help shape regulatory 
solutions that promote technologies that, in turn, will help secure the values 
of free expression. 
I 
HOW THE DIGITAL AGE CHANGES THE CONDITIONS OF SPEECH 
The next Part of this essay describes how the digital revolution alters 
our perspective on freedom of speech and leads to a series of disputes about 
what the free speech principle means.  By the “digital revolution,” I mean 
the creation and widespread availability of technologies that make it easy to 
copy, modify, annotate, collate, transmit, and distribute content by storing 
it in digital form.  These technologies also include the development of vast 
communication networks that connect every part of the world for the 
purpose of distributing digital content.  The digital revolution changes the 
factual assumptions underlying the social organization and social practices 
of freedom of speech in four important ways. 
First, the digital revolution drastically lowers the costs of copying and 
distributing information.  Large numbers of people can broadcast and 
publish their views cheaply and widely.  Websites, for example, are easy to 
construct and easy to access.  We do not yet know how low the costs of 
information transfer will become.  For example, the development of 
weblogs  (or blogs) allows people to publish content to the Internet with the 
press of a button, lowering the costs of publication and distribution even 
further. 
Before the Internet, free speech theorists worried about the scarcity of 
bandwidth for broadcast media.  Frequencies were limited, so only a 
relatively few people could broadcast to a large number of people.  The 
digital revolution made a different kind of scarcity salient.  It is not the 
scarcity of bandwidth but the scarcity of audiences, and, in particular, 
scarcity of audience attention.  My speech has always competed with 
yours; as the costs of distribution of speech are lowered, and more and 
more people can reach each other easily and cheaply, the competition for 
audience attention has grown ever more fervent.6  An interesting side effect 
of lowering the costs of distribution and transmission is that it can alter the 
 
 6 See Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech From a Meme’s Point of View 8, 13 (Apr. 4, 2003) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with New York University Law Review) (explaining rapid growth 
of expression on Internet in terms of lowered costs of production and distribution of information). 
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relative costs of receiving versus sending information.  Although receiving 
information is easier, sending information can become even less costly.  
The classic example is spam e-mail, which shifts the costs of distribution 
from speakers to audiences.  Because so many people are producing 
content and sending it everywhere, audiences are pummeled with vast 
amounts of information which they must collate, sort, filter, and block.  
Hence, the digital revolution brings to the forefront the importance of 
organizing, sorting, filtering, and limiting access to information, as well as 
the cultural power of those who organize, sort, filter, and limit access.7 
Second, the digital revolution makes it easier for content to cross 
cultural and geographical borders.  Not only can speakers reach more 
people in the country in which they live, they can also interact with and 
form new communities of interest with people around the globe.  It has 
long been possible to send information globally, but the cost and effort 
were comparatively great.  The Internet gives people abilities that were 
previously enjoyed only by large commercial enterprises; it offers them 
access to an infrastructure for sending information worldwide.8 
Third, the digital revolution lowers the costs of innovating with 
existing information, commenting on it, and building upon it.  An 
important feature of the digital revolution is the development of common 
standards for storing and encoding information digitally.  Common 
standards are absolutely crucial to lowering the costs of transmission and 
distribution.  (We might make a rough analogy to the role of 
standardization that accompanied the Industrial Revolution.)  However, the 
same features of content that make it possible for people to transmit and 
distribute information cheaply and easily also make it possible to 
manipulate, copy, and alter information cheaply and easily.  In the past it 
was always possible to copy a text or a drawing by hand, but such copying 
was comparatively expensive and time-consuming.  Once people have a 
common metric for storing images, music, and text, they can copy, cut, and 
paste information and send it to others.  Common standards for encoding 
images, music, and text not only make it easy to copy and distribute 
content, they also make it easier to appropriate, manipulate, and edit 
content. 
 
 7 See J.M. Balkin, Media Filters, the V-Chip, and the Foundations of Broadcast Regulation, 
45 DUKE L.J. 1131, 1145 (1996) (“In the Information Age, the informational filter, not 
information itself, is king.”); James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace:  Surveillance, Sovereignty, 
and Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177, 194 (1997) (noting that filtering technologies 
supply state with “a different arsenal of methods with which to regulate content”). 
 8 Lowering the costs of distribution also allows more speakers to reach across existing 
cultural, geographical, and disciplinary boundaries.  It allows information to get past previously 
closed communities, it enables new communities to form based on existing interests, and it helps 
create new interests around which communities can form. 
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The link between the ability to copy and the ability to modify 
information is central to understanding the possibilities created by the 
digital revolution.  Consumers of digital media products9 are not simply 
empowered to copy digital content; they are also empowered to alter it, 
annotate it, combine it, and mix it with other content and produce 
something new.  Software allows people to innovate with and comment on 
other digital media products, including not only text, but also sounds, 
photographs, and movies.  The standard example is the well-known story of 
The Phantom Edit, in which an individual reedited George Lucas’s Star 
Wars movie The Phantom Menace to eliminate as much as possible of the 
screen time devoted to a particularly obnoxious character, Jar Jar Binks.10  
The Phantom Edit exemplifies what the digital age makes possible.  It is 
not simply piracy; it is also innovation, although certainly not the sort of 
innovation that LucasFilms was interested in promoting.11  This innovation 
goes hand in hand with the possibility of digital piracy; both are forms of 
appropriation made possible by digital technologies and digital 
communications networks.  Lowering the costs of both distribution and 
appropriation are central features of the digital age.  Digital media, in short, 
invite not only simple copying but also annotation, innovation, and 
collage.12 
Fourth, and most important, lowering the costs of transmission, 
distribution, appropriation, and alteration of information democratizes 
speech.  Speech becomes democratized because technologies of 
distribution and transmission are put in the hands of an increasing number 
of people and increasingly diverse segments of society throughout the 
 
 9 I borrow this term from C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 7–14 
(2002) (noting important differences between media products and typical non-information 
goods). 
 10 On The Phantom Edit, see Richard Fausset, A Phantom Menace?, L.A. TIMES, June 1, 
2002, at F1. 
 11 Asked about the phenomenon by an interviewer, Lucas explained, 
[E]verybody wants to be a filmmaker.  Part of what I was hoping for with making 
movies in the first place was to inspire people to be creative.  The Phantom Edit was 
fine as long as they didn’t start selling it.  Once they started selling it, it became a 
piracy issue.  I’m on the Artist Rights Foundation board, and the issue of non-creators 
of a movie going in and changing things and then selling it as something else is wrong. 
Gavin Smith, The Genius of the System:  George Lucas Talks to Gavin Smith About Painting by 
Numbers, Mind-Numbing Minutiae, and Final Cuts, FILM COMMENT, July-Aug. 2002, at 31, 32. 
 12 James Boyle argues that a characteristic feature of the information society is that an 
increasing proportion of product cost goes to content creation rather than to distribution, and to 
message rather than medium.  James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property:  
Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87, 93–94 (1997).  That is not necessarily 
inconsistent with my argument that digital technologies lower costs of innovation:  Both content 
creation and distribution costs are lowered, but distribution costs decline much more rapidly.  In 
the meantime, digital technologies spur new forms of content creation that would have been 
prohibitively expensive (or impossible) in the past. 
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planet.  More and more people can publish content using digital 
technologies and send it worldwide; conversely, more and more people can 
receive digital content, and receive it from more and more people.  Equally 
important, speech becomes democratized because technologies of 
innovation are available to a wider range of people.  In the digital age, 
distribution and innovation go hand in hand. 
II 
ROUTING AROUND AND GLOMMING ON 
In the early days of the Internet, many people assumed that the 
Internet would displace the mass media and publishing houses as 
traditional gatekeepers of content and quality.  This has not occurred.  
Rather, the Internet has provided an additional layer of communication that 
rests atop the mass media, draws from it, and in turn influences it. 
Mass media are asymmetrical and unidirectional.  The ability to 
broadcast widely is held in relatively few hands; what is broadcast is sent 
out to a large number of people with very little opportunity for people to 
talk back.  Access to mass media is comparatively limited.  Mass media 
create a technological bottleneck, and the people who control mass media 
are gatekeepers controlling its use.  As a result, in a world dominated by 
mass media, the recurring problem for people who want to speak 
effectively and reach large numbers of people is how to gain access to an 
effective podium.  People can purchase access if they own a significant 
amount of property; in the alternative, they can stage media events to draw 
the mass media’s attention.  In the latter case, however, speakers cannot 
easily control their message. 
The Internet offers two different strategies for dealing with the mass 
media:  routing around and glomming on.  Routing around means reaching 
audiences directly, without going through a gatekeeper or an intermediary.  
For example, you can publish content on your own website or distribute 
copies of your band’s music on the Internet.  Routing around relieves the 
bottleneck problem to some extent, but it does not eliminate it.  Mass media 
are still quite important, because they are still comparatively few and 
individual speakers are many.  Mass media provide a focal point for 
audience attention:  Most people still pay much more attention to the 
relatively small number of traditional mass media speakers than they do to 
almost any particular website.  That should not be surprising, for two 
reasons.  First, traditional mass media have a head start in achieving a 
sizeable and stable audience because culture has been organized around 
them for so long.  Second, the large number of speakers on the Internet 
dilutes audience share and fragments audience attention for any single 
website, depriving the vast majority of Internet speakers of mass audiences 
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of the same size as the traditional mass media have enjoyed. 
Therefore, although the Internet allows people to shape public opinion 
by routing around traditional mass media, the latter still play a crucial role 
in setting agendas because they still provide the lion’s share of news and 
information to most people.  Mass media remain dominant sources of 
entertainment, and are likely to be so for the foreseeable future.  Because of 
economies of scale in production costs, mass media can also provide much 
more impressive and entertaining content than most individuals can. 
The second strategy for dealing with mass media responds to this fact.  
It is the strategy of glomming on.  To “glom on” means to appropriate and 
use something as a platform for innovation.  “Glomming on” as a strategy 
means appropriating things from mass media, commenting on them, 
criticizing them, and above all, producing and constructing things with 
them:  using them as building blocks or raw materials for innovation and 
commentary. 
The word “appropriate” means to make something one’s property.  It 
is sometimes defined as making something one’s exclusive property, as in 
appropriating a common benefit.  But the glomming on characteristic of the 
digital age is precisely the opposite—it is nonexclusive appropriation.  One 
appropriates something for one’s own use, but others are free to appropriate 
it as well.  This is especially the case with information goods, which are 
nonrivalrous and can be copied repeatedly at minimal cost. 
Glomming on, then, is nonexclusive appropriation of media content 
for the purpose of commentary, annotation, and innovation.  Here are four 
examples.  The first is the use and development of weblogs, or blogs.  
Blogs grab quotes and information from other sources, including the 
websites run by mass media like the New York Times and the Washington 
Post, and use them as launching pads for commentary.  Although a few 
blogs do original reporting, most of the blogosphere is devoted to 
commentary.13  A second example is the website Television Without Pity, 
run by a group of Canadian and American viewers.14  The site offers 
detailed scene-by-scene accounts of popular television shows in North 
America, laced with humorous and often biting commentary.  Television 
Without Pity has grabbed the attention of television companies, which are 
eager to know how their shows are being received by their audiences.15  
The strategy of glomming on allows at least some television viewers to talk 
 
 13 For a list of some of the most popular blogs, see The Truth Laid Bear’s Blogosphere 
Ecosystem, at http://www.truthlaidbear.com/ecosystem.php (last visited Nov. 17, 2003). 
 14 See http://www.televisionwithoutpity.com (last visited Oct. 27, 2003). 
 15 Marshall Sella, The Remote Controllers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2002, (Magazine), at 70 
(noting that “[i]t is now standard Hollywood practice for executive producers . . . to scurry into 
Web groups moments after an episode is shown on the East Coast,” hoping to discover what core 
viewers like and dislike). 
  
April 2004] DIGITAL SPEECH AND DEMOCRATIC CULTURE 11 
 
back to television producers.  Fan fiction sites, which are devoted to the 
creation of stories about particular movies, books, and television shows, are 
a third example of glomming on.16  The Phantom Edit, which I mentioned 
earlier, is a fourth example of glomming on; it uses a traditional mass 
media product as an artistic platform for innovation. 
Glomming onto the work of others has always existed.  It is a standard 
form of cultural transmission and evolution.  The digital revolution 
enhances opportunities for glomming on to the work of traditional mass 
media and distributing these innovations and commentary worldwide.  The 
point is not that more glomming on is occurring, although that may be the 
case, but that more people are able to glom on with greater effect.  In 
theory, at least, digital technology allows glomming on to be broadcast as 
widely as the media product itself.  People used to talk about last night’s 
television programs at the water cooler the next morning; now they can 
publish their thoughts and distribute them to a global and anonymous 
audience.  People have long written stories about their favorite literary 
characters, created parodies of familiar stories and songs, and gossiped 
about their favorite artists.  These cultural appropriations were 
commonplace but moved in relatively constricted circles.  They existed 
everywhere but were not distributed everywhere.  All this has changed.  
The very technologies that make transmission and distribution of digital 
information relatively costless have made glomming on a force to be 
reckoned with. 
What I have called glomming on—the creative and opportunistic use 
of trademarks, cultural icons, and bits of media products to create, 
innovate, reedit, alter, and form pastiches and collage—is a standard 
technique of speech in the digital world.  Glomming on is cultural bricolage 
using cultural materials that lay to hand.  Precisely because of the 
astounding success of mass media in capturing the public imagination 
during the twentieth century, the products of mass media, now everywhere 
present, are central features of everyday life and thought.  Mass media 
products—popular movies, popular music, trademarks, commercial 
slogans, and commercial iconography—have become the common 
reference points of popular culture.  Hence, it is not surprising that they 
 
 16 For examples of fan fiction, see generally http://www.fanfiction.net (last visited July 10, 
2003).  On the clash between fan fiction and copyright law, see Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions:  
Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651 (1997); Ariana 
Eunjung Cha, Harry Potter and the Copyright Lawyer, WASH. POST, June 18, 2003, at A1; Tracy 
Mayor, Taking Liberties with Harry Potter, BOSTON GLOBE, June 29, 2003, (Magazine), at 14.  
The practice predates the Internet, see HENRY JENKINS, TEXTUAL POACHERS:  TELEVISION FANS 
& PARTICIPATORY CULTURE 152–62 (1992), but the Internet has helped spur the formation of 
new communities of fan fiction writers, whose collective efforts have drawn the attention (and 
occasionally the ire) of television producers. 
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have become the raw materials of the bricolage that characterizes the 
Internet. 
Indeed, as they were originally developed, significant aspects of the 
Internet and digital technology facilitate glomming on.  I have already 
mentioned the creation of common standards for encoding digital content.  
HTML and its successors also encourage glomming on, because they 
facilitate copying of source material and allow documents to point to each 
other.  This, in turn, allows people to move seamlessly between documents 
and blurs the lines between them.  To be sure, these features of the digital 
revolution need not remain untouched:  As I shall now describe, businesses 
have tried to erect technological and legal barriers to glomming on.  My 
point, however, is that what gives rise to these reactions by businesses are 
the characteristics of digital media that facilitate the cheap and widespread 
appropriation, manipulation, distribution, and exchange of digital 
information.  Those very characteristics lead to attempts to undermine, 
limit, and cabin the facility that digital media provide. 
Indeed, routing around and glomming on are not merely specific 
responses to mass media; they are basic characteristics of Internet speech 
generally.  Unless the Internet’s architecture has been specifically modified 
to prevent it,17 it is usually possible to route around any existing channel or 
site of discourse and start a conversation elsewhere.  Similarly, unless there 
are technological devices put in place to avoid it, the Internet lends itself to 
the nonexclusive appropriation of existing content and its subsequent 
modification, annotation, and parody. 
III 
THE SOCIAL CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION 
Digital technology lowers the costs of distribution and production of 
content, both locally and worldwide.  It makes it easier for people to 
innovate using existing information and copy and distribute what they 
produce to others.  It makes it possible for more and more people to 
participate in the creation and distribution of new forms of public 
discourse, new forms of art, and new expressions of creativity. 
The very same features of the digital age that empower ordinary 
individuals—low costs of distribution and ease of copying and 
transformation—empower businesses as well.  Because it is easier and 
cheaper to copy and distribute media products worldwide, the digital age 
opens new markets for media products in digital formats, like compact 
 
 17 This is the major concern of LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF 
CYBERSPACE (1999) [hereinafter LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE], and 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS:  THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED 
WORLD (2001) [hereinafter LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS]. 
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discs, DVDs, and streaming media. 
The digital revolution, after all, is an economic revolution as well as a 
technological one.  Because more types of media and information products 
can be sold to more people in more places, media products and, more 
generally, information itself, become increasingly important sources of 
wealth.  In the same fashion, the infrastructure necessary to communicate 
and distribute information widely becomes an important source of wealth.  
As happened in the first age of industrialization, businesses discover 
economies of scale in the creation and distribution of information and 
media products.  They become larger and more powerful; media and 
information industries become increasingly concentrated. 
So the digital age produces two crucial trends:  the democratization of 
digital content and the increasing importance of digital content as a source 
of wealth and economic power.  These trends quickly come into conflict.  
That conflict, and its consequences for freedom of speech, is the central 
problem of the digital age. 
The irony is this:  The very same features of the digital age that 
empower ordinary individuals also lead businesses continually to expand 
markets for intellectual property and digital content.  Yet as businesses do 
so, they must deal with features of the digital age that empower consumers 
and give them new abilities to copy, distribute, and manipulate digital 
content.  Businesses wish to use the new technologies to deliver more and 
more content to more and more consumers, providing ever new services, 
ever new opportunities to purchase, and ever new forms of customization.  
But the technologies that allow the penetration and expansion of markets 
also allow consumers to route around existing media and glom on to digital 
content.18 
 
 18 The basic conflict between centralized control of information production and distribution 
and routing around and glomming on that I have identified here has many different aspects.  
Yochai Benkler views the conflict in terms of contrasting methods of information production—a 
conflict between, on the one hand, an industrial model of protection that produces mass culture 
prepackaged for consumption, and, on the other, various models of nonproprietary and peer 
production.  Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass:  Alice and the Constitutional 
Foundations of the Public Domain, 66 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 181 (2003) [hereinafter 
Benkler, The Public Domain]; see also Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users:  Shifting the 
Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 561, 562 (2000).  The same technologies that allow the industrialization of the goods 
of the mind also make possible new forms of peer production and collaboration.  See J.M. Balkin, 
What Is a Postmodern Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1966, 1974, 1983 (1992) (defining 
postmodern era as era of industrialization of products of mind); see also Yochai Benkler, Coase’s 
Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 375–90 (2002) (describing 
rise of collaborative methods for commons-based peer production). The struggle between these 
models of production, which is waged both in politics and in law, will determine the “institutional 
ecology” of information production in the next century.  Benkler, The Public Domain, supra, at 
181. 
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It is obvious that businesses are worried about digital piracy—and, 
more generally, forms of digital appropriation—made possible by digital 
technologies.  That is why conflicts between freedom of speech and 
intellectual property have come to the forefront of concern.  But businesses 
are also concerned about the ability of consumers to alter or even refuse the 
conditions under which digital content is delivered and offered.  Businesses 
would like to offer goods and services under conditions that encourage 
consumers to buy them.  They want to facilitate advertising that supports 
their ventures.  They want consumers to experience digital products in 
ways that will encourage consumption and increase profits, and they want 
to structure the digital environment accordingly.  But digital technologies 
allow consumers the ability to route around these conditions.  Thus, the 
conflict produced by the digital age is not simply a conflict about copying 
and piracy.  It is also a conflict about control. 
In a sense, this conflict was inevitable:  Once intellectual property, 
information exchange, and media products become important sources of 
wealth, it is only natural that businesses will seek to maintain their profits 
through increasingly aggressive forms of legal and technological control.  
Thus, at the very moment when ordinary people are empowered to use 
digital technologies to speak, to create, to participate in the creation of 
culture, and to distribute their ideas and innovations around the world, 
businesses are working as hard as possible to limit and shut down forms of 
participation and innovation that are inconsistent with their economic 
interests. 
We face, in other words, what Marx would have called a contradiction 
in social relations produced by technological innovation.19  By 
“contradiction,” I don’t mean a logical contradiction, but rather an 
important and pervasive social conflict brought about by technological 
change, a conflict that gets fought out in culture, in politics, and, perhaps 
equally importantly, in law.  The social contradiction of the digital age is 
that the new information technologies simultaneously create new forms of 
freedom and cultural participation on the one hand, and, on the other hand, 
new opportunities for profits and property accumulation that can only be 
achieved through shutting down or circumscribing the exercise of that 
freedom and participation. 
The social conflict produced by technological change is both a conflict 
of interests and a conflict of values.  It produces opposed ideas of what 
freedom of speech means.  The social contradictions of the digital age lead 
to opposing views about the scope and purposes of the free speech 
principle.  This conflict appears in a number of different areas.  Here I will 
 
 19 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, in THE MARX-ENGELS 
READER 4, 4–5 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1978). 
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mention only two of them:  intellectual property and telecommunications 
policy. 
A. Intellectual Property 
The first example is the growing tension between intellectual property 
and freedom of speech.  That conflict has always existed, but new digital 
technologies have made it more salient and important.20  In hindsight, the 
conflict between intellectual property and freedom of speech is obvious:  
The whole point of intellectual property law is to bestow monopoly rights 
in certain forms of expression, subject to safety valves like fair use and 
limited times.  In fact, in the United States one can even get injunctive 
relief against prospective copyright infringement, which flies directly in the 
face of the basic presumption against prior restraints on speech.21 
In the past, the conflict was often avoided through benign neglect.  
People engaged in technical violations of intellectual property rights all the 
time, but their activities were not widespread and distribution was 
relatively limited.  It didn’t matter much to IP owners if a few people wrote 
fan fiction on their typewriters, made jokes about trademarked elements in 
casual conversation or in limited geographic areas, or made the occasional 
copy of a record on their cassette tape recorder.  However, once digital 
content could be produced and distributed at relatively low cost and 
broadcast around the world, owners of intellectual property became much 
more worried about digital copying and trademark infringement on a 
massive scale, even as they became increasingly interested in exploiting 
derivative rights in works they already owned. 
Digital content produced by isolated individuals now competes more 
easily with existing media products, and more easily undermines or 
tarnishes existing trademarks.  Conversely, lower costs of distribution of 
digital content encourage businesses to promote their rights ever more 
aggressively because they can expand into new geographical markets and 
achieve greater market penetration.  Technological change exacerbates a 
tension that was always present but remained dormant until low-cost 
methods of distribution arrived on the scene.  Indeed, the digital revolution 
 
 20 On the emerging conflict between freedom of speech and intellectual property, see Yochai 
Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection:  The Role of Judicial Review in the 
Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 587–600 
(2000) (suggesting conflict between free speech rights and database protection); Yochai Benkler, 
Free as the Air to Common Use:  First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public 
Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 393–401, 412–14 (1999) (arguing that given emerging methods 
of production of digital information, copyright promotes neither diversity of information nor free 
expression). 
 21 See generally Mark Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in 
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998). 
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is merely the latest episode in a much longer series of technological 
innovations that have led to the current conflict between freedom of speech 
and intellectual property rights.  Throughout the twentieth century, mass 
media have become increasingly pervasive in cultural life.  Print media 
spread more widely through technological innovation.  The motion picture 
industry took off in the early part of the twentieth century, followed by 
radio, television, cable, and satellite broadcasting.  All of these 
technologies changed how widely and cheaply one could distribute content.  
Each of them, in their own way, lowered distribution costs, even if they 
also raised the costs of content creation. 
As these forms of mass media became increasingly pervasive parts of 
our life, the industries that create content—Hollywood, the publishing 
industry, and the advertising industry to name only three examples—began 
to push for increased protections of intellectual property rights.  The reason 
is simple.  Being able to distribute media products to more and more people 
justifies greater and greater investments in content creation, including, 
among other things, the assembly of vast teams of people to create movies, 
television shows, advertising campaigns, and the like.  To recoup these 
costs, producers sought to squeeze as much profit as they could out of their 
media products, and one way to do that was to make their rights more 
valuable by pushing aggressively for additional legal protections. 
Thus, during the twentieth century intellectual property rights have 
expanded both horizontally and vertically.22  Examples of horizontal 
expansion include increasing the scope of derivative rights that apply to a 
work at a particular point in time—the right to plot, characters, sequels, 
design features, orchestration, and so forth.  Other examples are the 
development of process patents and the creation of trademark dilution law.  
Intellectual property rights have also expanded vertically, as the length of 
copyright terms has been repeatedly extended forward, and previous works 
have been retroactively given extensions to keep them in parity with newer 
works.  A recent example in the United States is the Sonny Bono Copyright 
Term Extension Act of 1998,23 named after the former pop singer and 
Congressman.  It extended copyrights in the United States from the life of 
the author plus 50 years to life plus 70 years; it also extended copyright 
terms to 95 years after publication for works created by corporate or 
anonymous authors (or 120 years after creation, whichever is shorter). 
Media companies, however, have not limited themselves to legal 
devices.  They have also attempted to use technology to protect their 
interests in intellectual property.  An increasingly important form of 
 
 22 For a summary of the expansion in copyright law, particularly since 1970, see Neil 
Netanel, Locating Copyright in the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18–26 (2001). 
 23 Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000)). 
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intellectual property protection involves digital rights management 
schemes, technological devices that prevent copying of and control access 
to digital content.  The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 199824 created 
a new species of legal rights, sometimes called “paracopyright,” that make 
it unlawful to circumvent these technological devices or distribute 
circumvention devices to others.  Although digital rights management is 
often justified as a means of preventing unauthorized copying, it actually 
goes much further.  It is part of a general strategy of control over access to 
digital content, including digital content that has been purchased by the end 
user.25  Digital rights management schemes, for example, can make digital 
content unreadable after a certain number of uses; they can control the 
geographical places where content can be viewed; they can require that 
content be viewed in a particular order; they can keep viewers from 
skipping through commercials; and so on.  Paracopyright creates legal 
rights against consumers and others who wish to modify or route around 
these forms of technological control.  Once again we see how technological 
innovation produces social conflict:  Because digital technologies make it 
easier to manipulate digital content in ever new ways, both businesses and 
consumers want increased control over how digital content is experienced. 
Matters have come to a head as copying and modification of digital 
content have become widespread, and media companies have sought in 
increasingly aggressive ways to protect their existing rights and expand 
them further.  The problem is that these legal and technological strategies 
are seriously curtailing freedom of expression.  Not surprisingly, media 
companies have generally resisted the idea that freedom of speech limits 
the expansion of intellectual property rights.  Nevertheless, at the same 
time that media corporations have resisted free speech objections to the 
expansion of intellectual property rights, they have avidly pushed for 
constitutional limits on telecommunications regulation on the ground that 
these regulations violate their own First Amendment rights. 
B. Telecommunications Policy 
This brings us to the second great battleground over freedom of 
speech:  telecommunications policy.  Mass media communication delivers 
content through some medium of transmission, whether it be spectrum, 
networks, telephone wires, or cables.  Technologies of distribution are the 
“pipes” through which content travels.  The key question in the digital age 
is who will control these “pipes.” 
 
 24 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §1201 (2000)). 
 25 See generally LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 17, at 180–217; Niva Elkin-
Koren, It’s All About Control:  Rethinking Copyright in the New Information Landscape, in THE 
COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 79 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil W. Netanel eds., 2002). 
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Historically, telecommunications policy in the United States has 
developed through several different models.  Telephone companies have 
been viewed as conduits for the speech of others, exercising no 
independent editorial function.  They are regarded as common carriers 
required to provide access to all.  Broadcasters, cable companies, and 
satellite companies, by contrast, have been treated as hybrid enterprises.  
Because they provide programming and exercise editorial judgment, they 
have been treated as speakers with free speech rights.  However, because 
they control key communications networks that are not freely available to 
all,26 they have also been subject to structural public-interest regulation.  
Broadcasters were at one point required to cover public issues and cover 
both sides of these issues fairly; they are still required to provide equal time 
to political candidates and to sell advertising time to federal candidates for 
office; cable companies have been required to make room for public, 
educational and government channels, to carry signals from spectrum 
broadcasters, and to provide cable access to low-income areas; satellite 
companies have been required to set aside space for educational purposes, 
and so on.27 
The digital revolution has undermined one of the traditional 
justifications for structural regulation of the mass media—scarcity of 
bandwidth.  Cable can accommodate hundreds of channels, as can satellite 
broadcasting.  The number of speakers on the Internet seems limitless.  
Broadcast media now compete with cable, satellite, and the Internet for 
viewer attention.  In theory, at least, digital technologies offer everyone the 
potential to become broadcasters. 
Telecommunications companies have pointed to these changes as 
 
 26 Cf. Turner Broad. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 656 (1994) (arguing that monopoly 
power and cable architecture create bottlenecks and exclude others from speaking); Red Lion 
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388–392, 392 (1969) (“There is no sanctuary in the First 
Amendment for unlimited private censorship operating in a medium not open to all.”). 
 27 See 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (2000) (requiring broadcasters to “allow reasonable access to 
or . . . permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time” to “legally qualified candidate[s] for 
Federal elective office”); 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2000) (establishing “equal opportunities” rule 
requiring broadcasters who permit one candidate to “use” station to permit candidate’s opponents 
to “use” station as well); 47 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2000) (requiring broadcasters to sell time at lowest 
unit charge to political candidates); 47 U.S.C. § 531(b) (2000) (authorizing franchise authorities 
to require cable companies to set aside space for public access, educational and government 
channels); 47 U.S.C. § 532(b)(1) (2000) (establishing “leased access” provisions which require 
cable operators to set aside channel capacity for use by commercial programmers unaffiliated 
with cable franchise operator); 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3) (2000) (requiring assurances in awarding 
cable franchises that cable access “is not denied to any group of potential residential cable 
subscribers because of the income of the residents of the local area in which such group resides”); 
47 U.S.C. § 335(b)(1) (2000) (requiring direct broadcast satellite operators to set aside portion of 
“channel capacity, equal to not less than 4 percent nor more than 7 percent, exclusively for 
noncommercial programming of an educational or informational nature”); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 
373–75 (describing fairness doctrine). 
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reasons to loosen or eliminate structural regulations of broadcast, cable, 
satellite, and Internet access.  Businesses have argued that must-carry 
requirements for cable, open access requirements for broadband 
companies, limitations on how many media outlets a single business entity 
can own, and other structural and public interest obligations interfere with 
media companies’ rights to convey the content they wish to as large an 
audience as possible.  They have argued that these regulations, and others 
like them, violate their First Amendment rights as speakers and editors, and 
courts in the United States have increasingly begun to agree with them.28 
Implicit in these arguments is a controversial capitalist theory of 
freedom of speech.  The theory is controversial not because it accepts 
capitalism as a basic economic ordering principle, but because it 
subordinates freedom of expression to the protection and defense of capital 
accumulation in the information economy.  The capitalist theory identifies 
the right to free speech with ownership of distribution networks for digital 
content.  Although distribution networks are “public” in the sense that lots 
of different people use them and rely on them for communication, their 
hardware and software are privately owned.  Hence, businesses argue, 
regulation of the distribution network is a regulation of the freedom of 
speech of the network owner, because the network owner “speaks” through 
its decisions about which content to favor and disfavor.  Must-carry rules 
interfere with the editorial judgment of cable companies; open access 
requirements interfere with the programming choices of broadband 
companies; restrictions on the amount and geographical scope of media 
ownership interfere with the ability of media companies to send their 
content to as many people as possible. 
The capitalist theory is controversial precisely because 
telecommunication enterprises are hybrids of content providers and 
conduits for the speech of others.  This is especially true for broadband, 
cable, and satellite transmission.  Recent telecommunications mergers have 
further exacerbated this hybridization by forming a small number of large, 
vertically integrated media conglomerates with interests in broadcast 
media, cable, satellite, book publishing, movie production, telephone and 
 
 28 See, e.g., Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1136, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(invalidating FCC’s limits on vertical and horizontal integration of cable carriers); Comcast 
Cablevision, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685, 694 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (holding that 
open access requirements for broadband cable violate First Amendment rights of cable system 
owners); see also U.S. West, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 1994) (striking 
down ban on telephone companies also selling video content to the public), vacated as moot, 516 
U.S. 1155 (1996); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181, 202 (4th Cir. 
1994) (same), vacated as moot, 516 U.S. 415 (1996).  The last two cases were held moot by the 
Supreme Court in light of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 
56 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2000)), which repealed the statutory ban on cross- 
ownership. 
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Internet services. 
The argument that structural regulation of telecommunications 
networks restricts the First Amendment rights of telecommunications 
companies ties the right to speak ever more closely to ownership of capital.  
Arguing by analogy to print media, the capitalist theory of free speech 
identifies the right to produce and control digital content with ownership of 
a communications network.  Nevertheless, conflating the right to speak 
with the right to control a communication network is problematic for two 
reasons.  First, because they are conduits and networks, digital 
communications networks are designed to provide access to multiple 
voices.  However, under the capitalist theory, these conduits exist primarily 
to promote the speech of the owner of the conduit, just as newspapers exist 
to promote the speech of the newspaper’s owner.  The second problem 
follows from the first:  Content providers who also act as conduits have 
incentives to favor their content over the content of others.  For example, 
cable companies may be tempted to favor streaming media and digital 
music coming from the company’s content providers and advertising 
partners, while slowing down or refusing content coming from competitors, 
or, for that matter, from subscribers who want to be their own 
broadcasters.29  Broadband companies may seek to provide “walled 
gardens” or “managed content areas” which limit consumer access to that 
of the company’s proprietary network and its approved content partners.30  
Broadband companies may attempt to control the end user’s Internet 
experience by creating what Cisco Systems has called “captive portals,” 
which, in the company’s own words, give a cable system owner “the ability 
to advertise services, build its brand, and own the user experience.”31  The 
purpose of these innovations is to guide the end user into a continuous 
series of offers to consume goods and services from which the Internet 
access provider will glean profits.  Through skillful control of the 
distribution network, access providers can determine who gets to see what 
 
 29 See LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 17, at 156–58 (quoting Jerome Saltzer, 
“Open Access” is Just the Tip of the Iceberg (Oct. 22, 1999), at 
http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/openaccess.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2003) 
(offering examples of gatekeeping by cable networks)). 
 30 See Hernan Galperin & Francois Bar, The Regulation of Interactive Television in the 
United States and the European Union, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 61, 62–64, 69–72 (2002) (discussing 
strategy of walled gardens in interactive television services); Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Hal J. Singer, 
Open Access to Broadband Networks:  A Case Study of the AOL/Time Warner Merger, 16 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 631, 656 (2001) (noting dangers of conduit discrimination as well as 
content discrimination). 
 31 Data Sheet, Cisco 6400 Service Selection Gateway, at 
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/cc/pd/as/6400/prodlit/c6510_ds.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 
2003); see also Jeffrey A. Chester, Web Behind Walls, TECH. REV., June 2001, at 94, 94, 
available at http://www.democraticmedia.org/resources/articles/webbehindwalls.html (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2003). 
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programming and under what terms.  The goal is not simple ideological 
censorship but diversion of end users into ever new consumption 
possibilities.  Access providers seek to cocoon their customers, offering 
continuous promotion of brands and shopping possibilities while the end 
user surfs the Internet. 
Here we can see a second aspect of the social conflict brought about 
by technological innovation.  New telecommunications networks allow 
ordinary people to communicate with vast numbers of fellow human 
beings, routing around existing media gatekeepers and offering competing 
content.  People are no longer simply consumers of prepackaged content 
from mass media companies that are controlled by a limited number of 
speakers.  Instead, people can use the new telecommunications networks to 
become active participants in the production of public culture.  But the very 
same technologies that offer these possibilities also offer media companies 
ever new ways to advertise, sell products, and push their favored content.  
Thus, just as in the case of intellectual property, businesses that control 
telecommunications networks will seek to limit forms of participation and 
cultural innovation that are inconsistent with their economic interests.  
Once again, the goal is not necessarily censorship of unpopular ideas but 
rather diversion and co-optation of audience attention.  Businesses want to 
direct the Internet user toward increased consumption of their own goods 
and services as well as the products of their advertising partners.  
Recognizing that there is money to be made in advertising, sales, and 
delivery of content, telecommunications companies do not want to be pure 
conduits for the speech of others, and they do not want too much content 
competition from their customers.  Instead, they want to use the 
architecture of the Internet to nudge their customers into planned 
communities of consumerist experience, to shelter end users into a world 
that combines everyday activities of communication seamlessly with 
consumption and entertainment.  In some respects, businesses seek to push 
consumers back into their pre-Internet roles as relatively passive recipients 
of mass media content.  In other respects, however, they openly encourage 
interactivity, but interactivity on their terms—the sort of interactivity that 
facilitates or encourages the purchase of goods and services. 
Another way of seeing the social “contradiction” created by the 
Internet is through the concept of “public” space.  Is the Internet a private 
space or a public space?  Digital communications networks are held in 
private hands, increasingly by large media conglomerates who also hold 
interests in digital content production and who wish to sell their own goods 
and services and advertise the goods and services of others.  From their 
perspective, the “publicness” of digital communications networks is merely 
a side effect of the use of private property by private actors.  Because 
digital communications networks are privately owned, those who own them 
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have the right to structure entry to and use of the network by other private 
actors.  Rather than vindicating free speech values, regulating digital 
communications networks violates the free speech rights of 
telecommunications companies. 
On the other hand, digital communications networks are “public” in 
the sense that the public uses them as a space for general interaction.  The 
information superhighway is a public highway used by the public for public 
communication, debate, gossip, and every possible form of exchange of 
information.  Digital communications networks are also “public” in the 
sense that their value as networks arises from public participation that 
produces network effects:  Communications networks are valuable to 
individuals because the public in general uses them, and the larger share of 
the public that uses the network, the more valuable the network becomes.  
In other words, a key source of value of the communications network is its 
publicness, the fact that its inhabitants and its users are the public at large.  
Because digital communications networks serve a public function and 
because they gain their value from public participation, the argument goes, 
digital communications networks should be regulated to serve the public 
interest and to allow members of the public to use them as public spaces for 
communication, cultural innovation and public participation.  Without such 
regulation, powerful private interests will trample on free speech values in 
the relentless pursuit of profits. 
IV 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE SECOND GILDED AGE 
Let me summarize the argument so far:  Technological innovations in 
the digital age have produced conflicts about the meaning of free 
expression in two different locations.  The first is the scope of intellectual 
property; the second is the regulation of telecommunications networks.  
The conflict over freedom of speech looks quite different in these two 
areas.  In intellectual property, media corporations have pushed for ever-
greater protection of intellectual property through both legal and 
technological means.  They have rejected complaints that ever-expanding 
intellectual property rights and digital rights management schemes inhibit 
freedom of expression because they eliminate fair use and shrink the public 
domain.  In telecommunications regulation, by contrast, media corporations 
have aggressively pushed for expansion of free speech rights, arguing that 
the right to free speech includes the right to control communications 
networks.  Invoking a property-based theory of free expression, they have 
rejected arguments that public regulation is necessary to keep conduits 
open and freely available to a wide variety of speakers. 
Thus, in the digital age, media corporations have interpreted the free 
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speech principle broadly to combat regulation of digital networks and 
narrowly in order to protect and expand their intellectual property rights.  
What is more, courts increasingly have begun to agree with these two 
positions.32 
These positions seem inconsistent on their face.  In fact, they are not.  
They reflect a more basic agenda:  It is not the promotion and protection of 
freedom of speech per se, but the promotion and protection of the property 
rights of media corporations.  Both intellectual property and freedom of 
speech have been reconceptualized to defend capital investments by media 
corporations.  Intellectual property rights, paracopyright, and digital rights 
management are justified as necessary to protect property rights and 
maintain a fair return on investment.  Freedom of speech increasingly is 
being reinterpreted as the right to be free from economic regulation of 
digital communications networks.  This is part of a larger trend of the past 
twenty-five years, in which businesses have also used the First Amendment 
to attack restrictions on advertising and campaign finance.33  We are just 
beginning to see the First Amendment invoked to defend the accumulation 
and sale of consumer data against government regulation.34  One of the 
most important developments of the past quarter century is the emergence 
of the First Amendment and the free speech principle as anti-regulatory 
tools for corporate counsel.35  At the same time, intellectual property, 
paracopyright, and digital rights management are being invoked not only to 
restrict cultural experimentation and innovation, but to control how 
ordinary individuals experience the Internet.36  What these positions have in 
common is not a libertarian impulse, but a desire for greater control over 
 
 32 See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’d sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003) (holding that First Amendment poses no obstacle to Congressional 
extension of copyright terms that shrink scope of public domain, even when extension is 
retroactive); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(upholding constitutionality of application of Digital Millenium Copyright Act to DeCSS and 
enjoining linking to websites from which DeCSS might be obtained), aff’d sub nom. Universal 
City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2001); supra note 26 (citing additional cases). 
 33 See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism:  Legal Realist Approaches to the First 
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 375–87 (noting “ideological drift” of free speech principle to 
protect propertied and corporate interests). 
 34 See, e.g., U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1235, 1239 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(invalidating, on First Amendment grounds, FCC regulations protecting privacy and sale of 
telephone customers’ personal information).  On some of the problems faced in squaring 
consumer privacy with a libertarian conception of freedom of speech, see Eugene Volokh, 
Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy:  The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop 
People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2000). 
 35 Balkin, supra note 33, at 384; Mark Tushnet, Corporations and Free Speech, in THE 
POLITICS OF LAW:  A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 253 (David Kairys ed., 1982); Mark Tushnet, An 
Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1386–92 (1984). 
 36 LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 17, at 196–202; Elkin-Koren, supra note 25, at 
84–85, 88–98. 
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how individuals will be permitted to use digital networks and digital 
content; which is to say, it is a desire for control over the very technologies 
that had created new possibilities for individual freedom and cultural 
innovation in the digital age. 
In a sense, this development was inevitable.  In the world in which we 
live, intellectual property and control of digital communications networks 
are increasingly important sources of wealth.  The defense of those forms 
of wealth must find a legal manifestation.  Intellectual property and 
freedom of speech serve these functions admirably. 
We have been through this before.  Jacksonian and abolitionist ideas 
before the Civil War produced a constitutional vision of free labor and free 
contract.  This constitutional vision celebrated the right of ordinary 
individuals to own their labor.  Laissez-faire was defended as a means of 
keeping government from giving special benefits to the wealthy.  As 
America industrialized, corporations took up these Jacksonian and 
abolitionist ideas and reinterpreted them, transforming them into defenses 
of corporate property rights and constitutional attacks on government 
regulation of employment conditions.  Courts issued labor injunctions 
against union organizing on the grounds that allowing workers to form 
unions undermined the value of employer investments in capital.37  Courts 
turned the ideology of free labor into a constitutional principle of liberty of 
contract that prevented governments from regulating wages and working 
conditions.38 
In what Clinton Rossiter called the “Great Train Robbery of 
Intellectual History,”39 laissez-faire conservatives appropriated the words 
and symbols of early nineteenth-century liberalism—liberty, opportunity, 
progress, and individualism—and gave them an economic reinterpretation 
that served corporate interests.40  They massaged and refitted the existing 
rhetoric of free labor and the right of ordinary citizens to pursue a calling 
into a sophisticated defense of corporate power and privilege that smashed 
labor unions, protected sweatshops, and eviscerated health and safety 
 
 37 Cf. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 328 (1921) (holding that attempt to ban labor 
injunctions violated property rights of business owner). 
 38 A substantial literature has developed explaining how Gilded Age ideas of freedom of 
contract were created out of Jacksonian and free labor ideals.  See, e.g., Michael Les Benedict, 
Laissez-Faire and Liberty:  A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire 
Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293 (1985); William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free 
Labor:  Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767, 798–99 (1985); Charles 
W. McCurdy, The Roots of “Liberty of Contract” Reconsidered:  Major Premises in the Law of 
Employment, 1867–1937, 1984 YEARBOOK OF THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY 20. 
Revisions of this view have suggested that other influences were also at work, see Stephen A. 
Siegel, The Revision Thickens, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 631 (2002), but have not undermined the 
basic point that corporate interests made ample use of these rhetorical resources. 
 39 CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA 128 (2d ed. rev. 1962). 
 40 Id. at 128–62; see Balkin, supra note 33, at 383–87. 
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laws.41  By the turn of the twentieth century, the best legal minds that 
money could buy had reshaped the liberal rights rhetoric of the 1830s into a 
powerful conservative defense of property that they claimed was the 
rightful heir to the best American traditions of individualism and personal 
freedom. 
A similar transvaluation of values is overtaking the free speech 
principle today.42  The right to speak has been recast as a right to be free 
from business regulation.  Copyright is slowly being converted to property 
simpliciter with virtually perpetual terms; trademark and patent have 
steadily grown in scope; and database protection, already extant in the 
European Union,43 is on the horizon in the United States.44  Indeed, in some 
respects, digital rights management and paracopyright offer copyrighted 
works even greater protection than ordinary property receives.45  
Intellectual property, which was originally viewed as a limited government 
monopoly designed to encourage innovation, has been transformed into a 
bulwark against innovation, facilitating control over digital content and 
limiting the speech of others. 
We are living through a Second Gilded Age, which, like the first 
Gilded Age, comes complete with its own reconstruction of the meaning of 
liberty and property.46  Freedom of speech is becoming a generalized right 
 
 41 See generally ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW:  
ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887–1895 (1960); BENJAMIN R. TWISS, LAWYERS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION:  HOW LAISSEZ FAIRE CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT (1942). 
 42 The comparison between the ideological drift of the principles of freedom of contract and 
freedom of speech is explored in Balkin, supra note 33, at 375–87, and J.M. Balkin, Ideological 
Drift and the Struggle over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV. 869 (1993). 
 43 Council Directive 96/9, 1996 O.J. (L 77/20) (providing for legal protection of databases 
which, “by reason of the selection or arrangements of their contents, constitute[] the author’s own 
intellectual creation”). 
 44 For a discussion of recent attempts, see Dov S. Greenbaum, The Database Debate:  In 
Support of an Inequitable Solution, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 431, 468–78 (2003). 
 45 Cf. Randal C. Picker, From Edison to the Broadcast Flag:  Mechanisms of Consent and 
Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 293–96 (2003) (noting that 
digital rights management permits perfection of continuing control over use of intellectual 
property in digital content even after media product has been purchased). 
 46 Or, in Julie Cohen’s memorable phrase, we are entering the era of “Lochner in 
Cyberspace.”  Julie Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace:  The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights 
Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998). 
Paul Schwartz and William Treanor argue, by contrast, that calls for constitutional 
limitations on the expansion of intellectual property are the best analogy to the laissez-faire 
constitutional conservatism of the Gilded Age; they compare arguments for constitutional 
protection of the public domain to Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Paul M. Schwartz & 
William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner:  Copyright Term Extension and Intellectual 
Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331, 2334–35, 2394–95, 2411 (2003). They 
fail to consider the social and economic context in which the debate over laissez-faire 
conservatism occurred.  In effect, Schwartz and Treanor argue that small-scale artists, software 
programmers, Internet end users, and consumers who seek a robust public domain are the 
functional equivalent of the Robber Barons and concentrated economic interests of the Gilded 
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against economic regulation of the information industries.  Property is 
becoming the right of the information industries to control how ordinary 
people use digital content.  We can no more capitulate to the Second 
Gilded Age’s construction of these ideas than to the constructions offered 
in the first Gilded Age.  We must offer a critical alternative to this 
construction, much as progressive thinkers did a century ago. 
V 
THE PROGRESSIVIST THEORY AND ITS LIMITATIONS 
So far, I have explained how digital technologies have changed the 
social conditions in which speech is produced, and I have described the 
way that the information industries have attempted to reinterpret freedom 
of speech.  These reinterpretations reflect the interests of businesses 
attempting to secure certain privileges in a changing economy.  They are by 
no means necessary or inevitable, and indeed, I think that they are in many 
respects mistaken. 
There is a better way to understand the free speech principle in the 
digital era.  The alternative is a theory of freedom of speech based on the 
idea of a democratic culture.  In order to explain this alternative, I would 
 
Age, while today’s media corporations like Microsoft, Disney and Viacom are the functional 
equivalent of immigrant laborers in sweatshops at the turn of the century. 
Because they focus exclusively on arguments about the scope of the Copyright Clause, and 
pay no attention to telecommunications law, Schwartz and Treanor do not recognize that the free 
speech principle is the key battleground for the legal protection of capital in the information 
economy.  Opposition to the Copyright Term Extension Act turned precisely on the fact that the 
political economy of the information age blurs distinctions between regulations of speech and 
regulations of business practices in media corporations, and that ever-expanding property rights 
in patent, trademark, and copyright adversely affect freedom of expression.  See Brief of Jack M. 
Balkin et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petition at 15–21, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 
186 (2003) (No. 01-618), available at 2002 WL 1041899. 
Much more troubling than the Court’s conclusions about the Copyright Clause in Eldred is 
its cavalier dismissal of the important free speech interests in limited copyright terms.  See 
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218–22.  From this perspective, Eldred most closely resembles not Lochner v. 
New York, but the early twentieth-century cases Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), and Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), in 
which the Court rejected free speech claims and exercised judicial restraint.  The danger is that an 
unrestrained legislature beholden to media interests will continually ramp up intellectual property 
protections at the expense of the free speech interests of others. 
Schwartz and Treanor note the argument that the expansion of intellectual property arises 
from rent-seeking by media corporations that have corrupted the political process.  Schwartz & 
Treanor, supra, at 2406. However, failing to recognize the First Amendment interests involved, 
they assume that the only issue is the adjustment of property rights between competing 
stakeholders.  They argue that the defects of political process, even if serious, cannot justify 
heightened judicial review, see United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 
(1938), because the theory of process protection should not apply to ordinary economic and social 
legislation but only to “the representation of minorities.” Schwartz & Treanor, supra, at 2407.  
Perhaps tellingly, they omit the Carolene Products Court’s argument that the theory of process 
protection is equally concerned with securing freedom of speech. 
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like to retrace my steps and think about how free speech theory dealt with 
the last great technological change, the rise of broadcast media. 
Probably the most important theoretical approach to freedom of 
speech in the twentieth century has argued that freedom of speech is 
valuable because it preserves and promotes democracy and democratic self-
government.  The notion that there is an important connection between 
freedom of speech and democracy is hardly new—people have understood 
the connection for as long as democracies have been around.  But the 
twentieth century produced a special emphasis on that connection, and 
during the course of the twentieth century, many thinkers claimed that the 
very purpose of freedom of speech was not so much to promote individual 
autonomy or personal fulfillment as to promote democratic deliberation 
about public issues.  We can find the beginnings of this idea in Progressive 
Era thinkers in the first two decades of the twentieth century.47  The most 
famous statement is by the philosopher of education Alexander 
Meiklejohn,48 and his approach has greatly influenced later theorists.49 
As a shorthand, I will call the democracy-based approach of 
Meiklejohn and his followers the “republican” or “progressivist” approach.  
That is because a focus on democratic deliberation rather than individual 
autonomy is characteristic of republican political theory, and it is also 
characteristic of much thinking in the Progressive Era in the United 
 
 47 See MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH:  THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF 
CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM 92–93, 122–26 (1991) (noting rise of democratic conception in 
Progressive period and discussing democratic elements in Zechariah Chafee, Jr.’s theory of free 
expression); David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Progressive Social Thought,  74 TEX. L. REV. 
951, 954–88 (1996) (discussing free speech theories of early twentieth-century progressive 
thinkers, including John Dewey and Herbert Croly). 
 48 See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM:  THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1960) [hereinafter MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM]; Alexander 
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245 [hereinafter 
Meiklejohn, First Amendment]. 
 49 See, e.g., OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996) [hereinafter FISS, THE IRONY 
OF FREE SPEECH]; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); 
Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (1986) [hereinafter Fiss, 
Free Speech and Social Structure]; Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781 
(1987) [hereinafter Fiss, Why the State?]; Harry Kalven, The New York Times Case:  A Note on 
“The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191. Fiss well describes the 
centrality of this theory in twentieth-century legal thought: 
The theory that animates this protection [of the speaker’s autonomy], and that inspired 
Kalven, and before him Meiklejohn, and that now dominates the field, casts the 
underlying purpose of the first amendment in social or political terms:  The purpose of 
free speech is not individual self-actualization, but rather the preservation of 
democracy, and the right of a people, as a people, to decide what kind of life it wishes 
to live.  Autonomy is protected not because of its intrinsic value, as a Kantian might 
insist, but rather as a means or instrument of collective self-determination.  We allow 
people to speak so others can vote.  Speech allows people to vote intelligently and 
freely, aware of all the options and in possession of all the relevant information. 
Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, supra, at 1409–10. 
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States.50  Progressivism is a sensibility, an attitude about what democracy is 
and what wise government can do.  The progressive has faith in 
government’s ability to promote the public interest through rational 
deliberation, works to structure government and public decisionmaking to 
promote deliberation and consensus about important public policy issues, 
worships expertise, and views popular attitudes and popular culture with 
suspicion because they tend to be emotional, parochial, irrational, 
untutored, and in need of channeling, refinement, and education.51 
I think it is no accident that the progressivist/republican approach to 
free speech arose in the twentieth century, for this was also the century of 
mass media.  People who endorse democratic theories of free speech 
understand that although mass media can greatly benefit democracy, there 
is also a serious potential conflict between mass media and democratic self-
governance.  The reason is that mass media are held by a comparatively 
few people, and their ownership gives this relatively small group enormous 
power to shape public discourse and public debate.  The danger is that they 
will use their dominant position in three equally worrisome ways. 
The first worry is that the people who control mass media will skew 
coverage of public issues to promote views that they support.  In a world 
where ownership of mass media is concentrated in the hands of a relatively 
few very wealthy individuals and corporate conglomerates, the agendas and 
concerns of the wealthy will prevail, constricting discussion of serious 
issues and serious alternatives to the status quo.  As a result, people will get 
disinformation or a skewed picture of the world around them, and this will 
be harmful for democracy. 
The second worry is that mass media will omit important information, 
issues, and positions that the public should take into account.  As a result, 
people will be exposed to only a limited set of issues to deliberate about, 
and to only a limited number of ways of thinking about and dealing with 
this limited set of issues. 
The third worry is that mass media will reduce the quality of public 
discourse in the drive for higher ratings and the advertising revenues and 
other profits that come with them.  Mass media will oversimplify and dumb 
down discussions of public issues, substitute sensationalism and 
amusement for deliberation about public questions, and transform news and 
politics into forms of entertainment and spectacle.  The endless drive for 
advertising revenues and profits tends to drive out serious discourse and 
 
 50 On the connections between democratic free speech theory and republicanism, see BAKER, 
supra note 9, at 126–27, 138–43, 152–53, 170–76.  On the connection to the thought of the 
Progressive Era, see GRABER, supra note 47, at 75–121; Balkin, supra note 2, at 1947–48, 1956–
58; Rabban, supra note 47. 
 51 Balkin, supra note 2, at 1947–48, 1956–58. 
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replaces it with mind-numbing entertainment.  This demobilizes the public, 
leaving them less and less interested in focusing on important public issues 
of the day. 
For these three reasons, democracy-based theorists of free speech in 
the twentieth century have argued that government must regulate the mass 
media in a number of different ways:  (1) by restricting and preventing 
media concentration; (2) by imposing public-interest obligations that 
require the broadcast media to include programming that covers public 
issues and covers them fairly; and (3) by requiring the broadcast media to 
grant access to a more diverse and wide-ranging group of speakers in order 
to expand the agenda of public discussion. 
The progressivist/republican approach is an important counterweight 
to a market-oriented approach to freedom of speech that ties speech rights 
closely to ownership of property.  I mentioned this approach in my 
discussion of telecommunications policy in the digital age, but of course, 
the argument that people who own telecommunications media should be 
free of government regulation predates the Internet.  Indeed, the new 
market-based arguments are simply logical continuations of arguments for 
deregulation of the broadcast media that have been going on for many 
years.52  The Internet has simply given media corporations a new 
justification for using the free speech principle as an anti-regulatory tool:  
Because people do not need access to the mass media to speak, 
governments have lost their greatest justification for mass media 
regulation. 
However, we cannot expect that the Internet will adequately 
compensate for any loss in media diversity that might come from 
deregulation, elimination of public interest obligations, and increased 
media concentration.  First, market concentration in mass media is not 
unrelated to market concentration in cable and broadband ownership.  
Many of the same companies that have gobbled up an increasingly large 
share of mass media markets also have control over cable companies and 
broadband companies.  As we have seen, these companies have interests in 
eliminating competition and controlling the Internet experience of end 
users.  So increased media concentration may actually exacerbate or 
dovetail with loss of end-user autonomy on the Internet.  Second, the 
quality and diversity of information that flows over the Internet is 
inevitably shaped by the quality and diversity of information available in 
broadcast media and cable, because that is where a very large number of 
people still get most of their news and information.  If more traditional 
 
 52 See, e.g., Mark S. Fowler & David L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast 
Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207 (1982) (arguing for repeal of most forms of broadcast 
regulation). 
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mass media provide disinformation, constrict agendas of public discussion, 
displace discussion of public issues, and demobilize audiences, Internet 
speech can only partially compensate.  We cannot view the Internet as a 
complete substitute for mass media.  Instead, Internet speech is layered on 
top of the forms of public discourse and discussion that cable and broadcast 
media provide.  This follows from my argument that speech on the Internet 
routes around and gloms onto the products of the mass media.  The mass 
media remain a central substrate on which Internet speech builds. 
Nevertheless, the Internet does make a difference to freedom of 
speech.  The digital age exposes weaknesses and limitations in democracy-
based theories of free speech, just not the ones with which the capitalist 
approach is concerned. 
Progressivist and republican approaches arose in response to the 
challenge to democracy posed by mass media.  And their limitations arise 
from the same set of concerns.  The progressivist/republican approach is 
limited in three important respects.  First, it emphasizes political questions 
and deliberation about public issues over other forms of speech.  It tends to 
value other kinds of speech to the extent that they contribute to public 
discussion of political questions rather than for their own sake.  Second, for 
the same reason, the progressivist/republican approach tends to downplay 
the importance of popular culture, too often seeing it as ill-informed and a 
distraction from serious issues.  Third, because its paradigmatic concern is 
broadcast media held by a relatively small number of people, who may 
misuse their power to control the public agenda or demobilize the citizenry, 
the progressivist/republican approach tends to downplay the centrality of 
liberty and personal autonomy to freedom of speech.53  It focuses instead 
on equality and on the production of a suitable agenda for public 
discussion.  In Meiklejohn’s famous phrase, the point of freedom of speech 
is not that everyone shall speak, but that “everything worth saying shall be 
said.”54 
The progressivist/republican argument that we should not tie the right 
of free speech too closely to the right of private property remains valid, 
particularly in an age of increasing media concentration.  That is because 
the liberty of speech and the liberties involved in property ownership are 
 
 53 Meiklejohn was perhaps most overt about this, arguing that the First Amendment “has no 
concern about the ‘needs of many men to express their opinions’” but rather is concerned with 
“the common needs of all the members of the body politic.” MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, 
supra note 48, at 55; see also id. at 56–57, 61 (criticizing Zechariah Chafee, Jr. for being “misled 
by his inclusion of an individual interest within the scope of the First Amendment,” and Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes for his “excessive individualism”).  Owen Fiss, likewise, has emphasized 
that the First Amendment’s concern with autonomy is primarily instrumental:  “Autonomy may 
be protected, but only when it enriches public debate.” Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 49, at 
786. 
 54 MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 48, at 26. 
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two different kinds of freedom.  Although property rights often assist free 
expression—think of the right to use the software and the computer that 
one owns—they can also undermine it, as suggested by the examples of 
content discrimination in telecommunications networks and the use of 
digital rights management to control the end user’s experience. 
Nevertheless, the paradigm case that motivates the progressivist 
agenda—the case of few speakers broadcasting to a largely inactive mass 
audience—no longer describes the world we live in.  Even if, as I have 
argued, the new digital technologies do not displace mass media, they exist 
alongside it and build on top of it.  Digital technologies give lots of people, 
more than ever before, a chance to participate in the creation and 
development of public culture.  Technological changes in how speech is 
transmitted, and in who gets to participate in that transmission, change the 
focus of free speech theory. 
VI 
THE IDEA OF A DEMOCRATIC CULTURE 
Let me begin by pointing to five characteristics of Internet speech that 
I believe are exemplary of freedom of speech generally.  These 
characteristics are hardly new to the Internet; rather, my point is that the 
Internet makes them particularly salient.  That salience, I shall argue, 
reshapes our conception of the free speech principle. 
First, speech on the Internet ranges over every possible subject and 
mode of expression, including the serious, the frivolous, the gossipy, the 
erotic, the scatological, and the profound.  The Internet reflects popular 
tastes, popular culture, and popular enthusiasms. 
Second, the Internet, taken as a whole, is full of innovation.  The 
tremendous growth of the Internet in a relatively short period of time shows 
how enormously creative ordinary people can be if given the chance to 
express themselves.  And it demonstrates what ordinary people can do 
when they are allowed to be active producers rather than passive recipients 
of their cultural world. 
Third, much of the source of that creativity is the ability to build on 
something else.  This is particularly true of the World Wide Web.  As 
originally conceived, the very structure of HTML code encourages 
copying, imitation, and linking.  The continual innovation and 
transformation we see in digital media stems directly from their ability to 
use the old to make the new.  Digital media allow lots of people to 
comment, absorb, appropriate, and innovate—to add a wrinkle here, a 
criticism there.  Internet speech continually develops through linkage, 
collage, annotation, mixture, and through what I have called routing around 
and glomming on.  Internet speech, like all speech, appropriates and 
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transforms.  It imitates, copies, builds upon and mixes. 
Fourth, Internet speech is participatory and interactive.  People don’t 
merely watch (or listen to) the Internet as if it were television or radio.  
Rather, they surf through it, they program on it, they publish to it, they 
write comments and continually add things to it.  Internet speech is a social 
activity that involves exchange, give and take.  The roles of reader and 
writer, producer and consumer of information are blurred and often 
effectively merge. 
Fifth, and finally, because Internet speech is a social activity, a matter 
of interactivity, of give and take, it is not surprising that Internet speech 
creates new communities, cultures and subcultures.  In this way, it 
exemplifies an important general feature of freedom of speech:  Freedom of 
speech allows us, each of us, to participate in the growth and development 
of the cultures and subcultures that, in turn, help constitute us as 
individuals.  Freedom of speech is part of an interactive cycle of social 
exchange, social participation, and self-formation.  We speak and we listen, 
we send out and we take in.  As we do this, we change, we grow, we 
become something other than we were before, and we make something new 
out of what existed before. 
To sum up, the Internet makes particularly salient five facts about free 
speech:  Speech ranges over a wide variety of subjects, including not only 
politics but also popular culture.  The speech of ordinary people is full of 
innovation and creativity.  That creativity comes from building on what has 
come before.  Speech is participatory and interactive as opposed to mere 
receipt of information.  It merges the activities of reading and writing, of 
production and consumption.  Finally, speech involves cultural 
participation and self-formation.  The Internet reminds us how central and 
important these features are to speech generally.  It reveals to us in a new 
way what has always been the case. 
And this brings me to a central point:  The populist nature of freedom 
of speech, its creativity, its interactivity, its importance for community and 
self-formation, all suggest that a theory of freedom of speech centered 
around government and democratic deliberation about public issues is far 
too limited.  The free speech principle has always been about something 
larger than democracy in the narrow sense of voting and elections, 
something larger even than democracy in the sense of public deliberation 
about issues of public concern.  If free speech is about democracy, it is 
about democracy in the widest possible sense, not merely at the level of 
governance, or at the level of deliberation, but at the level of culture.  The 
Internet teaches us that the free speech principle is about, and always has 
been about, the promotion and development of a democratic culture. 
Democracy is far more than a set of procedures for resolving disputes.  
It is a feature of social life and a form of social organization.  Democratic 
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ideals require a further commitment to democratic forms of social structure 
and social organization, a commitment to social as well as political 
equality.55  And the forces of democratization operate not only through 
regular elections, but through changes in institutions, practices, customs, 
mannerisms, speech, and dress.  A “democratic” culture, then, means much 
more than democracy as a form of self-governance.  It means democracy as 
a form of social life in which unjust barriers of rank and privilege are 
dissolved, and in which ordinary people gain a greater say over the 
institutions and practices that shape them and their futures. 
What makes a culture democratic, then, is not democratic governance 
but democratic participation.  A democratic culture includes the 
institutions of representative democracy, but it also exists beyond them, 
and, indeed undergirds them.  A democratic culture is the culture of a 
democratized society; a democratic culture is a participatory culture. 
If the purpose of freedom of speech is to realize a democratic culture, 
why is democratic cultural participation important?  First, culture is a 
source of the self.  Human beings are made out of culture.  A democratic 
culture is valuable because it gives ordinary people a fair opportunity to 
participate in the creation and evolution of the processes of meaning-
making that shape them and become part of them; a democratic culture is 
valuable because it gives ordinary people a say in the progress and 
development of the cultural forces that in turn produce them. 
Second, participation in culture has a constitutive or performative 
value:  When people are creative, when they make new things out of old 
things, when they become producers of their culture, they exercise and 
perform their freedom and become the sort of people who are free.  That 
freedom is something more than just choosing which cultural products to 
purchase and consume; the freedom to create is an active engagement with 
the world.56 
 
 55 On the social features of democracy implicit in the idea of a democratic culture, see J.M. 
Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2314 (1997); J.M. Balkin, The 
Declaration and the Promise of a Democratic Culture, 4 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 167 (1999). 
 56 Legal scholars influenced by John Fiske have argued that intellectual property law should 
also serve the goals of promoting popular participation in culture, or what Fiske called “semiotic 
democracy.” See, e.g., William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1203, 1217 (1998) (“In an attractive society, all persons would be able to 
participate in the process of meaning-making.  Instead of being merely passive consumers of 
cultural artifacts produced by others, they would be producers, helping to shape the world of ideas 
and symbols in which they live.”); see also Kenneth Karst, Local Discourse and the Social Issues, 
12 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 1, 27 (2000) (defining cultural democracy as “the broadest possible 
participation in the cultural processes that define and redefine the sort of society we shall be”).  
Larry Lessig’s recent call for “free culture,” see LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 17, at 
9–10, also has important connections to the principles of semiotic democracy and democratic 
culture, as does David Lange’s notion of free appropriation as a right of citizenship exercised in 
the public domain, see David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. 
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By “culture” I mean the collective processes of meaning-making in a 
society.  The realm of culture, however, is much broader than the concern 
of the First Amendment or the free speech principle.  Armaments and 
shampoo are part of culture; so too are murder and robbery.  And all of 
these things can affect people’s lives and shape who they are.  The realm of 
culture for purposes of the free speech principle is a subset of what 
anthropologists study as forms of culture.  It refers to a set of historically 
contingent and historically produced social practices and media that human 
beings employ to exchange ideas and share opinions.57  These are the 
methods, practices, and technologies through which dialogue occurs and 
public opinion is formed.  For example, today people generally regard art 
as a social practice for the exchange of ideas, and they regard motion 
pictures as a medium of expression.58  These practices and media of social 
 
PROBS. 463, 475–83 (2003). 
Important examples of this trend in intellectual property scholarship include Rosemary J. 
Coombe, Author/izing the Celebrity:  Publicity Rights, Postmodern Politics, and Unauthorized 
Genders, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 365 (1992); Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property 
and Subjects of Politics:  Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 
1853 (1991); Rosemary J. Coombe, Publicity Rights and Political Aspiration:  Mass Culture, 
Gender Identity, and Democracy, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1221 (1992); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, 
Expressive Genericity:  Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 397 (1990); Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change:  A Democratic Approach to 
Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 272–73 (1996); David 
Lange, At Play in the Fields of the Word:  Copyright and the Construction of Authorship in the 
Post-Literate Millennium, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (1992); Jessica Litman, The Public 
Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); Madow, supra note 2; William Fisher, Theories of 
Intellectual Property, at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/Academic_Affairs/coursepages/tfisher/iptheory.html (last visited 
Dec. 3, 2003). 
Other scholars have sought to connect the proper scope of copyright, fair use and the public 
domain to the promotion of democracy in the sense of public discussion of public issues.  See 
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 347–65 
(1996) [hereinafter Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society] (arguing that copyright 
promotes democracy by funding independent sectors of creativity); Neil Weinstock Netanel, 
Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free Expression, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1879 
(2000).  This strand of intellectual property scholarship is somewhat closer to the republican or 
progressivist model; it emphasizes the importance of democratic public discourse and views 
popular culture as valuable to the extent that it contributes to a democratic civil society.  See 
Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, supra, at 351 n.310. 
 57 For a helpful discussion, see Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1253–55 (1995).  Post argues that social practices and media for the 
communication of ideas are central to the formation of public opinion.  Robert Post, Reconciling 
Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2353, 2367–69 (2000); 
Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, supra, at 1275–77. 
 58 It was not always thus.  See Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, supra note 57, 
at 1252–53 (discussing Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 236 U.S. 230, 243–45 (1915), in 
which Supreme Court originally held that motion pictures were not “organs of public opinion”).  
By 1952, the Supreme Court had come around, stating that “it cannot be doubted that motion 
pictures are a significant medium for the communication of ideas.” Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. 
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).  The difference between the Court’s statements in 1915 and 
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communication construct the realm that we regard as “speech” for purposes 
of the free speech principle.59  We cannot give an exhaustive list of these 
practices and media precisely because the social conventions and 
technologies that define them are always evolving; even so, it seems clear 
enough that the Internet and other digital technologies are media for the 
communication of ideas, and an increasingly important way for people to 
express their ideas and form their opinions.60  They are central—and I 
would say crucial—media for the realization of a democratic culture. 
Culture has always been produced through popular participation.  
Digital technology simply makes this aspect of democratic life more 
obvious, more salient.  Radio and television are technologies of mass 
cultural reception, where a few speakers can reach audiences of indefinite 
size.  But the Internet is a technology of mass cultural participation in 
which audiences can give as well as receive, broadcast as well as absorb, 
create and contribute as well as consume.  Digital technology makes the 
values of a democratic culture salient to us because it offers the 
technological possibility of widespread cultural participation. 
What is the difference between grounding freedom of speech on the 
promotion of democracy and grounding it on the promotion of a democratic 
culture?  What is at stake in the move to culture? 
There are three important differences, I think, and each stems from the 
weaknesses of the progressivist/republican model:  They concern the status 
of nonpolitical expression, the role of popular culture, and the importance 
of individual participation and individual liberty. 
A. Nonpolitical Expression 
A serious difficulty with the progressivist/republican model has 
always been that a wide variety of activities, of which art and social 
commentary are only the most salient examples, have always fit poorly into 
a democratic theory of free expression.  Lots of speech is not overtly 
political.  Nevertheless, it gets protected under the progressivist/republican 
 
1952 reflects important changes in American society to which the Court’s First Amendment 
doctrines eventually responded.  The scope of the free speech principle always grows out of a 
normatively inflected recognition of sociological realities. 
 59 The free speech principle also applies to regulations of conduct that do not involve a 
generally recognized medium for the communication of ideas when the government regulates 
conduct because it disagrees with or desires to suppress the ideas it believes the conduct 
expresses.  See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377–78 (1968) (holding that reasons for 
regulation of conduct must be unrelated to suppression of free expression).  Thus, when 
government effectively treats conduct as a medium for the communication of ideas and punishes 
it on that basis, the free speech principle is also implicated. 
 60 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997) (“The Internet is ‘a unique and wholly 
new medium of worldwide human communication.’” (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 
844 (E.D. Pa. 1996))). 
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model because it is useful for political discussion, because it may become 
enmeshed in political controversies (and thus threatened or suppressed for 
political reasons), or because it is very hard to draw lines separating what is 
political from what is not.61  In like fashion, lots of activities cannot easily 
be classified as deliberation—like singing, shouting, protesting, gossiping, 
making fun of people, or just annoying them or getting them angry.  
Nevertheless, these activities are protected because we can think of them as 
raw materials for further democratic deliberation or because we cannot 
easily draw lines separating them from the social practice of deliberation.62  
In both cases, then, we have kinds of speech that are at the periphery rather 
than the core; we protect them in aid of something more central and 
precious.  In short, the progressivist vision sees democratic deliberation 
about public issues at the core of constitutional concern and other subjects 
and other forms of expression as peripheral or supplementary. 
I have never been satisfied with this approach.  I think something is 
missing here, and the notion of democratic culture helps us understand 
why.  The point of democracy, as its name implies, is to put power in the 
hands of the people, to give ordinary people some measure of control over 
the forces that shape their lives and some degree of say about how the 
world around them develops.  But law and governance are only parts of this 
world.  Culture is an even larger part, and in some ways it has an even 
more capacious role in structuring our lives.  The various processes of 
communication and cultural exchange are the sources of the self and its 
development over time.  Our ideas, our habits, our thoughts, our very 
selves are produced through constant communication and exchange with 
others.63  The influence is reciprocal:  Through this continuous 
 
 61 Meiklejohn himself argued that works of art were protected speech because they promoted 
knowledge, sharpened intelligence, and developed sensitivity to human values, thus helping 
people to make political decisions.  Meiklejohn, First Amendment, supra note 48, at 255–57.  
Other scholars have recognized that not all artistic expression equally promotes democratic self-
government.  See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 49, at 153–59 (1993) (suggesting that nonpolitical 
art should be relegated to lower tier of First Amendment protection).  And of course Robert Bork, 
who also had a democracy-based theory of the First Amendment, famously argued that art should 
receive no First Amendment protection if it was not political speech.  Robert H. Bork, Neutral 
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 26–28 (1971). 
Owen Fiss believes, to the contrary, that art, particularly unorthodox art and art 
underappreciated by market forces, furthers the goals of collective self-determination and 
democratic deliberation.  He argues that government programs like the National Endowment for 
the Arts (NEA) that subsidize art should look to art that is concerned with issues on the public 
agenda or that should be on the public agenda of discussion and comment.  Thus, government 
subsidy of art should be designed to promote discussion of important public issues.  FISS, THE 
IRONY OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 49, at 40–45. 
 62 Cf. Owen M. Fiss, The Unruly Character of Politics, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 2–7 (1997) 
(noting limitations of Meiklejohnian metaphor of town meeting as applied to confrontational 
politics). 
 63 On the formation of self through cultural transmission, see JACK M. BALKIN, CULTURAL 
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communication and exchange, we shape culture and are shaped by it in 
turn.  We absorb it, we inhabit it, we make it new.  We send it out into the 
world, we make it part of us. 
Culture is more than governance, more than politics, more than law.  
And if democracy is giving power to the people, then true democracy 
means allowing people not only to have a say about who represents them in 
a legislature, or what laws are passed, but also to have a say about the 
shape and growth of the culture that they live in and that is inevitably part 
of them.  Power to the people—democracy—in its broadest, thickest sense, 
must include our relationship not simply to the state but to culture as a 
whole, to the processes of meaning-making that constitute us as 
individuals.  Those processes of meaning-making include both the ability to 
distribute those meanings and the ability to receive them.64 
Culture is an essential ingredient of the self, and so freedom of speech 
means participation in the forces of culture that shape the self.  We 
participate in the growth and development of culture through interaction, 
through communicating to others and receiving ideas from others.  Cultural 
democracy is memetic democracy, the continuous distribution, circulation, 
and exchange of bits of culture from mind to mind.65  This vision of culture 
is not democratic because people are voting on what is in their culture.  It is 
democratic because they get to participate in the meaning-making 
processes that form and reproduce culture.  They do this through 
communicating with and interacting with others.  Moreover, democratic 
culture is not democratic because people are participating in processes of 
deliberation about governance, or even public issues.  Rather it is 
 
SOFTWARE:  A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 269–85 (1998). 
 64 As Julie Cohen reminds us, digital technologies tend to blur the boundaries between 
production and reception, speaking and reading, or even between viewing and copying.  See Julie 
E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously:  A Closer Look at “Copyright Management” in 
Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1004–09 (1996); see also Rubenfeld, supra note 5, at 34–36 
(arguing that theories of freedom of expression based in autonomy and self expression do not 
sufficiently account for First Amendment right to read as well as to express one’s self). 
 65 Memetics is an evolutionary theory that attempts to explain the development of culture 
through the transmission of bits of culture, or memes, which replicate themselves in human 
minds.  The term “meme” was coined by the zoologist Richard Dawkins.  See RICHARD 
DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 189–94 (1977).  Memetic theory often tends to undermine agency 
and selfhood, see, e.g., SUSAN BLACKMORE, THE MEME MACHINE (1999), and thus would seem 
an odd choice for a theory of self expression.  But memetics can also be employed to explain 
concepts central to agency and selfhood like freedom, see DANIEL C. DENNETT, FREEDOM 
EVOLVES 175–92, 266 (2003), or the growth of human belief systems and human innovation, see 
BALKIN, supra note 63, at 42–97, 173–75. 
The idea of memetic democracy emphasizes the deep connections between self and agency 
on the one hand, and cultural evolution and the shaping of the self through cultural exchange on 
the other.  Memetic democracy means that everyone gets to participate in the distribution and 
dissemination of memes, which are the building blocks of the cultural software that constitutes 
individuals as individuals. 
  
38 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1 
 
democratic because it is participation in the creation and shaping of culture, 
which is, at the same time, participation in the growth and development of 
the self. 
B. Popular Culture 
The second basic problem with the work of Meiklejohn and his heirs 
has been its relative neglect and suspicion of popular culture.  Popular 
culture is often seen as mass culture controlled by corporations, which 
demobilizes the citizenry; as sensationalism or dumbed-down speech, 
which adds little of importance to democratic deliberation; or as mere 
entertainment, which distracts people from serious discussion of public 
issues.66  But from the perspective of democratic culture, popular culture 
and entertainment should not be merely peripheral or a distraction.  They 
should be a central part of what freedom of speech is about. 
In an age of unidirectional mass media, popular culture was, to a very 
large extent, mass culture—a set of commodities manufactured and sent out 
to be consumed by a mass audience.  But the Internet allows mass culture 
to be appropriated by ordinary citizens and become, more than ever before, 
a truly popular culture, because it allows what I have called routing around 
and glomming on.67 
 
 66 See, e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 138–41 (1991) (contrasting 
burdens of education for civic life with pleasantness of entertainment); SUNSTEIN, supra note 49, 
at 84–91 (decrying “low quality” programming that appeals to tastes of uneducated); Fiss, Free 
Speech and Social Structure, supra note 49, at 1413 (“From the perspective of a free and open 
debate, the choice between Love Boat and Fantasy Island is trivial.”); Fiss, Why the State?, supra 
note 49, at 788 (contrasting reruns of “I Love Lucy” and MTV with “the information [members of 
the electorate] need to make free and intelligent choices about government policy, the structure of 
government, or the nature of society.”).  Once again, this familiar progressivist theme is already 
present in Meiklejohn.  See MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 48, at 87 (attacking 
commercial radio for “corrupt[ing] both our morals and our intelligence”).  Even Justice Louis 
Brandeis fell prey to this sort of cultural elitism, which pervades his famous call for protecting the 
right of privacy from a particular form of speech.  See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The 
Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 (1890) (arguing that “personal gossip,” “[e]asy of 
comprehension [and] appealing to that weak side of human nature,” “crowds the space available 
for matters of real interest to the community,” and “destroys at once robustness of thought and 
delicacy of feeling”). 
 67 In this sense the Internet simply empowers the popular appropriation and transformation of 
mass culture that already existed: 
Much of mass culture involves programming, advertisements, architecture, and artwork 
produced by corporations and designed to sell products and make money.  Many 
critiques of mass culture warn of the deleterious consequences of consumerism and 
mass consumption. . . .  But a populist view [of democratic culture] also emphasizes 
that ordinary people are not mere passive receptors of the messages offered in 
advertising, television programming, and other elements of contemporary mass culture.  
Such assumptions are just another way of denigrating the intelligence and abilities of 
ordinary people.  People do not uncritically absorb and assimilate the images they see 
on the television screen—they process, discuss, and appropriate them.  People are 
active interpreters and rearrangers of what they find in mass culture.  They use the raw 
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We can understand the controversies over intellectual property in this 
light.  Media corporations are turning to digital rights management to avoid 
digital piracy.  But much of what traditional mass media most fears and 
resents is not piracy but cultural appropriation—individual riffs on mass 
media digital products shared with others—and the ability of consumers to 
route around a controlled advertising and marketing environment.  Shifting 
our focus from democracy to democratic culture helps us see that the 
problem in the digital age is not just deliberation about public issues.  It is 
also the importance of letting ordinary people engage in appropriation and 
innovation rather than mere consumption; it is the value of ordinary people 
being able to “rip, mix, and burn,”68 to route around traditional media 
gatekeepers and glom onto existing media products. 
In a democratic culture, we are interested in protecting not only 
speech about public issues, but also speech that concerns popular 
expression in art, as well as cultural concerns such as gossip, mores, 
fashions, and popular music.  The progressivist/republican approach has 
tended to valorize high culture and high quality programming as aids to 
democratic deliberation (often conflating the two in the process), with 
“low” culture protected only as a peripheral concern.69  But if freedom of 
speech is concerned with the promotion of a truly democratic culture, 
popular culture is every bit as important as so-called high culture.70  In fact, 
in a democratic culture, the distinction between high culture and low 
culture begins to blur and the difference between them becomes 
increasingly difficult to maintain.  High culture continually borrows from 
popular culture; moreover, as culture becomes increasingly democratized, 
the popular culture of today often turns out to be the high culture of 
tomorrow. 
 
materials of mass culture to articulate and express their values.  Through this process, 
they produce and reproduce popular culture. 
Balkin, supra note 2, at 1948–49 (footnotes omitted). 
 68 The reference is to Apple’s famous commercial instructing users of its iPod to “[R]ip, mix, 
and burn. . . .  After all, it’s your music.”  Larry Lessig uses the slogan as a metaphor for a free 
culture.  LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 17, at 9–11. 
 69 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 49, at 87–91; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the 
Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV. 499, 518 (2000) (arguing that goal of television regulation is to 
promote deliberative democracy). 
 70 See Balkin, supra note 2, at 1948 (“[P]opular culture is neither a debilitated version of 
democratic culture nor a mere diversion from the sober processes of deliberation imagined by 
progressivism.  It is not a sideshow or distraction from democratic culture but the main event.  
Moreover, [a] populis[t] [approach to free expression] accepts, as progressivism does not, that 
popular culture—which is also democratic culture—is by nature unkempt and unruly, 
occasionally raucous and even vulgar.  It is by turns both eloquent and mawkish, noble and 
embarrassing, wise and foolish, resistant to blandishments and gullible in the extreme.  It is 
imperfect in precisely the same sense that democracy itself is imperfect.”). 
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C. Individual Participation 
A third problem with the progressivist/republican model has been its 
tendency to seek to manage discourse and structure public debate.71  This 
desire is hardly surprising:  In a world dominated by mass media controlled 
by a relative handful of very wealthy corporations, it seems important to 
make sure that dissenting views get a word in edgewise, that serious issues 
are not driven out by the media’s never-ending quest for profits, and that 
audiences are not stultified and demobilized by an endless stream of 
increasingly vapid entertainment.  As a result, the progressivist model has 
downplayed individual liberty and instead played up the protection of 
democratic processes, including robust debate on public issues and the 
creation of an informed citizenry.  Earlier, I noted Meiklejohn’s famous 
statement that the point of freedom of speech is not that everyone shall 
speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said.  Meiklejohn even 
analogized the system of free expression to a town meeting.72  The purpose 
of the town meeting was to shape a public agenda for discussion of serious 
issues; there would be time for only some people to speak.  The important 
point was that the participants in the meeting be informed and stick to the 
agenda because everyone would decide what to do on the basis of the 
information presented.  Although Meiklejohn’s town meeting seems quite 
distant from the electronic mass media, it had many of the same features:  
scarcity of time, the need for a public agenda, and the importance of an 
informed citizenry.  Hence the need for regulation was very much the 
same. 
Democratic culture, by contrast, is not solely concerned with people’s 
ability to be informed about a particular agenda.  It is concerned with 
participation, interaction, and the ability of people to create, to innovate, to 
borrow ideas and make new ones.  Meiklejohn remarked that his ideal town 
meeting was “self-government,” not a “dialectical free-for-all.”73  That 
opposition may hold true for a particular form of democracy.  But in a 
democratic culture, and especially the culture of the Internet, freedom of 
expression is a dialectical free-for-all, a continuous process of interactivity 
and innovation, in which culture and discussion move and grow in any 
number of different directions. 
Here again a shift in focus from democracy to democratic culture 
 
 71 Robert Post has emphasized this limitation of the Meiklejohn model, arguing that the 
autonomy of public discourse, necessary for democratic self-government, is undermined by 
imposing managerial methods to cabin its scope and agendas.  See generally Robert Post, 
Managing Deliberation:  The Quandary of Democratic Dialogue, 103 ETHICS 654 (1993); Robert 
Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake:  Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1993). 
 72 MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 48, at 24–27. 
 73 Id. at 25. 
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responds to the sorts of freedoms that digital technologies make possible.  
Digital technologies and telecommunications networks mean that people 
are no longer forced into the role of mere spectators and consumers; they 
can be active participants, creating, commenting, and broadcasting their 
own ideas to a larger public.  And in a world in which active participation 
in the creation and distribution of culture becomes possible for so many, 
liberty is an important good to be prized, valued, and nourished. 
The progressivist/republican conception of free speech arose in the 
twentieth century because ordinary people were shut out of the most 
pervasive and important forms of speech and were reduced to the roles of 
spectators, consumers, and recipients.  In that world, protecting the liberty 
of a favored few who owned the means of communication from regulation 
was less important than producing discussion on public issues and 
promoting a robust agenda of diverse and antagonistic sources so that the 
citizenry could be well-informed and engaged with the great public issues 
of the day.  But new technologies make it possible for vast numbers of 
people to participate, innovate, and create, to route around and glom on to 
the traditional mass media and their products.  This has increased 
enormously the practical liberty of the ordinary citizen to speak, and to 
reach a vast audience.  When technology makes liberty possible, liberty 
once again must return to the forefront of concern.74 
 
 74 Indeed, the standard progressivist/republican arguments for regulation of broadcast, cable, 
and satellite can and should be rearticulated in terms of the more populist perspective of 
promoting democratic culture.  The key point is that the United States has adopted a hybrid 
system:  Instead of separating the functions of editor and distributor, and treating all distribution 
networks as common carriers like telephone companies, it has allowed a small number of 
editors/speakers to own powerful distribution networks not open to all in return for accepting 
various public service obligations and regulations.  Thus the hybrid system is based on the model 
of a contract or a quid pro quo. 
Although the hybrid system denies the vast majority of people free access to key distribution 
networks, it may nevertheless have been justified in the past by its economic advantages.  
Arguably it offers necessary incentives for broadcasters, cable companies, and owners of satellite 
systems to invest in, produce, and deliver a wide variety of diverse programming for viewers and 
listeners that will enrich public debate and public culture.  Thus, it provides considerable grist for 
the mill of a democratic culture. 
Nevertheless, a hybrid system is hardly perfect.  Heavy reliance on advertising tends to 
create a significant mismatch between what broadcasters deliver and what viewers want, in part 
because advertisers seek content that appeals to the common tastes of certain valued demographic 
groups (whose preferences may otherwise be quite heterogenous) rather than content that cross-
cuts demographic groups or appeals to groups with comparatively little disposable income or 
comparatively unmanipulable consumption patterns.  See BAKER, supra note 9, at 13, 24–26, 88–
91, 182–90. Advertisers will also tend to push for content that helps induce greater consumption 
instead of content that appeals to and fulfils other values that viewers might have.  For example, 
viewers may value many kinds of content that are not strongly tied to shopping, purchasing, and 
consumption.  They may value content that educates them or inspires them to change their lives, 
rethink their values, or make use of their creative powers.  Finally, market forces also will, almost 
by definition, underproduce content that has high positive externalities (like educational content, 
or balanced and informative coverage of news) because the value of that content to society cannot 
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The twentieth-century concern with speech as a method of democratic 
deliberation privileges the delivery of information about issues of public 
concern to the public, who receive this information through asymmetric 
and unidirectional mass media.  I do not wish to deny the importance of 
that conception; I merely want to insist that it is only a partial conception, 
inadequate to deal with the features of speech that the new digital 
technologies bring to the foreground of our concern.  The values behind 
freedom of speech are about production as much as reception, about 
creativity as much as deliberation, about the work of ordinary individuals 
as much as the mass media. 
Freedom of speech is more than the freedom of elites and concentrated 
economic enterprises to funnel media products for passive reception by 
docile audiences.  Freedom of speech is more than the choice of which 
media products to consume.  Freedom of speech means giving everyone—
not just a small number of people who own dominant modes of mass 
communication, but ordinary people, too—the chance to use technology to 
participate in their culture, to interact, to create, to build, to route around 
and glom on, to take from the old and produce the new, and to talk about 




Shifting our focus from democracy to democratic culture helps us 
better understand the idea of freedom of speech in the digital age.  Indeed, I 
would go even further.  Digital technologies change our understanding of 
what liberty of speech is.  They make salient features of freedom of speech 
that have always been present.  Digital technologies offer people the liberty 
 
be captured by market forces, and, all other things being equal, the greater the positive 
externalities, the more underproduction there will be.  Id. at 41–62, 114–18. 
The hybrid model of media regulation is not constitutionally required.  Rather, it is a quid 
pro quo or contractual arrangement, and it is constitutional to the extent that it promotes the 
values of a democratic culture.  To be sure, regulatory quid pro quos can violate free speech rights 
if they impose an unconstitutional condition on free speech.  However, structural regulations of 
the mass media that seek to counteract the limitations of mass media markets should be 
constitutional if there is a clear nexus between the goals of the regulation and the purposes behind 
the choice of a hybrid system.  To the extent that structural regulations and public interest 
obligations of mass media compensate for the limitations of a hybrid model, they are tied to the 
very justifications for issuing broadcast licenses and cable franchises in the first place:  They help 
further the goal of promoting a rich public sphere and a vibrant, participatory, and democratic 
culture.  If government can make a sufficiently good case that the regulations will have this 
effect, the regulations should not be regarded as unconstitutional conditions on a media 
company’s First Amendment rights.  Likewise, public broadcasting that supplements existing 
markets with content that government reasonably believes to be valuable (like children’s 
programming) should also be constitutionally permissible. 
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to participate in culture through application of existing cultural materials, 
the ability to appropriate and innovate using tools freely available to all.  
Digital technology offers a possibility, not yet fully realized (and 
conceivably one that will never be fully realized), of what democratic 
culture might be. 
A democratic culture is the culture of widespread “rip[ping], mix[ing], 
and burn[ing],”75 of nonexclusive appropriation, innovation, and 
combination.  It is the culture of routing around and glomming on, the 
culture of annotation, innovation, and bricolage.  Democratic culture is not 
the same thing as mass culture.  It makes use of the instrumentalities of 
mass culture, but transforms them, individualizes them, and sends what it 
produces back into the cultural stream.  In democratic culture, individuals 
are not mere consumers and recipients of mass culture but active 
appropriators.  Culture has always had opportunities for popular 
participation.  The Internet and digital technologies merely increase the 
number of opportunities for widespread distribution, their scope, and their 
power; and, in the process, make them more obvious to us.  Digital speech 
places these features of liberty—and the possibility of democratic culture—
more clearly and centrally before us. 
What is the liberty of expression, viewed from the perspective of the 
ideal of democratic culture?  I would say that it has four important 
components that have been made more salient by digital technology:  (1) 
the right to publish, distribute to, and reach an audience; (2) the right to 
interact with others and exchange ideas with them, which includes the right 
to influence and to be influenced, to transmit culture and absorb it; (3) the 
right to appropriate from cultural materials that lay at hand, to innovate, 
annotate, combine, and then share the results with others; and (4) the right 
to participate in and produce culture, and thus the right to have a say in the 
development of the cultural and communicative forces that shape the self. 
What these facets of liberty have in common is that they are not self-
regarding.  Communication is interaction, sharing, influencing, and being 
influenced in turn.  Creation is not creation ex nihilo, but building on the 
work of others; appropriation is not exclusive appropriation but making use 
of tools that lay to hand that are part of a common pool of resources.  
Distribution is not isolated but occurs through public pathways and 
networks that many can travel on.  Finally, development of the self is a 
project that one shares with others. 
In short, what the Internet makes salient to us is that freedom of 
expression, that most individualistic of liberties, that most personal of 
activities, is at the very same time deeply communal, because it is 
interactive, because it is participatory, because it builds on the work of 
 
 75 See supra note 68. 
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what others have done, and because it makes use of public networks and 
pathways of distribution.  I do not mean by this that liberty exists merely 
for the purposes of the state, or that individual liberty is an illusion.  Far 
from it.  I mean precisely the opposite—that the realization of individuality, 
the expression of one’s individual self, the promotion of one’s individual 
dignity, comes out of and through culture, a shared feature of life.  Culture 
is the substrate, the raw materials of individual freedom, from which 
individual liberty emerges and within which individual liberty operates and 
innovates.76 
The concept of a democratic culture restores freedom to its central 
place in free speech theory, but in the process, offers a particular 
conception of what that freedom is: 
Freedom is participation.  Freedom is distribution.  Freedom is 
interaction.  Freedom is the ability to influence and be influenced in turn.  
Freedom is the ability to change others and to be changed as well.  
Freedom is the ability to glom on and route around.  Freedom is 
appropriation, transformation, promulgation, subversion, the creation of the 
new out of the old.  Freedom is mixing, fusing, separating, conflating, and 
uniting.  Freedom is the discovery of synergies, the reshuffling of 
associations and connections, the combination of influences and materials. 
Freedom is bricolage. 
Dissent is central to this conception of free speech, for dissent is 
cultural as well as political.77  Just as the progressivist/republican critique 
has too narrow a focus on why speech is valuable, it has too limited a 
conception of dissent.  People may disagree with what the government is 
doing, and they may express themselves in politics, in music, or in art.  But 
they can also disagree with the aesthetics and mores of others, and they can 
dissent by borrowing from and subverting what they borrow.  And just as 
democratic culture undergirds democracy in the narrow sense without 
being identical to it, cultural dissent is an important source of political 
dissent without being subsumed by it. 
Perhaps equally important, dissent involves all of the features of 
liberty I have just described:  interaction, appropriation, and 
transformation.  Dissent reacts to, borrows from, and builds on what it 
disagrees with.  Dissent, whether in culture or in politics, is not mere 
negation.  Rather, dissent is creative and cumulative.  It appropriates 
elements of what it objects to and uses them in the process of critique, often 
through subverting or parodying them.78  The nature and focus of dissent is 
 
 76 See BALKIN, supra note 63, at 17–19. 
 77 See Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 498 (2001) (noting 
ubiquitous disputes within cultural groups about values of group and terms of membership). 
 78 See, e.g., JUDITH P. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE:  FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF 
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shaped by what the dissenter disagrees with, and the form of response is 
shaped by the way the problem appears to the critic.  Thus, dissent exists in 
an interactive and interdependent relationship to the object of its criticism, 
appropriating elements of what it rebukes in order to make its claims.  
Dissent makes use of the raw materials that inspire its disagreement and 
resistance.  In this way, dissent, and responses to dissent, are not mere 
repudiations of what has come before, but have a cumulative effect, 
building on existing materials and practices, and propelling and 
transforming culture forward. 
I have emphasized that the ability of ordinary individuals to produce 
their own culture is a central aspect of the liberty of free expression.  What 
justifies this populist focus?  Why shouldn’t we organize 
telecommunications and intellectual property law to maximize the ability of 
large business enterprises to make large investments in cultural products 
(e.g., blockbuster movies) while allowing consumers to choose which ones 
they prefer to consume in the marketplace?  Why isn’t this cultural division 
of labor an equally good protection of freedom of speech? 
One answer is that the ability to participate in culture and produce 
one’s own meanings can offer people greater self-realization and self-
fulfillment than perpetually being relegated to the docile consumption of 
mass media products.  But even if we remain agnostic on that point, being 
an active producer/creator is at least as good a way of living as being a 
passive consumer/recipient, and it is an equally important part of the liberty 
of expression. 
Market forces are likely to underprotect the right of ordinary 
individuals to be active cultural producers, because media companies are 
likely to make more money from consumption of the media products they 
advertise and sell.  From the standpoint of these companies, individual 
cultural production has no independent value except to the extent that it 
involves or leads to the consumption of media goods.  And to the extent 
that active cultural participation diverts end users from greater consumption 
of media products, interferes with the companies’ expansive definition of 
intellectual property rights, or challenges corporate technologies of control, 
it is less valuable than passive consumption; indeed it is positively harmful 
and must be cabined in. 
One might object that media companies will invest in products and 
services that facilitate individual cultural appropriation and production if 
 
IDENTITY 141–49 (1990) (noting possibilities for subversion of existing sexual roles and creation 
of new ones through repetition and through performance); Amy M. Adler, What’s Left?, 84 CAL. 
L. REV. 1499, 1529–31 (1996) (describing how pornography has been appropriated for feminist 
purposes); Judith P. Butler, The Force of Fantasy:  Feminism, Mapplethorpe, and Discursive 
Excess, 2 DIFFERENCES 105, 119–20 (1990) (arguing that “discursive excess” offers opportunities 
for subversion and parody). 
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consumers want them badly enough.  To some extent this is true:  We have 
already seen the beginnings of this in multi-user online games.  But 
individual cultural production often has high positive externalities; it 
provides benefits and satisfactions that are not easily captured by markets.79  
So media companies may have insufficient incentives to facilitate 
individual cultural appropriation and production.  Conversely, they will 
tend to over-invest in products that relegate individuals to a position of 
relatively passive consumers. 
Choosing what products to consume is a kind of liberty, but it does not 
exhaust the liberty of free expression.  The ability to produce, create, and 
innovate is just as important.  These two forms of liberty are not fungible, 
and markets do not adequately measure the difference between them.80  To 
protect freedom of expression, then, we must make a space for individual 
cultural appropriation and production.  We should not choose a form of 
political economy that gives greater incentives to be a passive recipient 
than an active creator of culture. 
Democratic culture is a regulative ideal.  It offers a picture of what the 
world could look like given the technology we now have.  It offers a 
picture of what freedom of speech could be in a digital world.  
Nevertheless, digital technology does not guarantee the production of a 
democratic culture.  As I noted previously, businesses are now using the 
new technologies to attempt to constrain and channel democratic 
participation.  They are doing so both through laws and through 
technological solutions, including packet discrimination and digital rights 
management.  And they are justifying these innovations through an 
interpretation of freedom of speech that ties speech to property rights.  This 
capitalist conception is important both for its explanation of what freedom 
of speech is (freedom from business regulation) and what it is not (an 
enforceable limit on the expansion of intellectual property rights). 
The ideal of democratic culture is important precisely as a critical 
perspective that allows us to criticize this emerging interpretation of free 
speech and intellectual property.  The developing capitalist conception of 
freedom of speech (and its accompanying denial of free speech limitations 
on the growth of intellectual property) is inconsistent with the promotion of 
a democratic culture.  The same technological changes that suggested what 
a democratic culture might become have produced a very different 
interpretation of the free speech principle that ties it ever more closely to 
 
 79 See BAKER, supra note 9, at 41–55. 
 80 Purchasing media products is a kind of liberty, because it involves choice.  It is also a kind 
of creativity, because an agreement between a willing buyer and a willing seller creates wealth.  
But it does not exhaust the forms of choice and creativity with which freedom of speech is 
concerned. 
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the ownership of the forms of capital characteristic of the information 
age—intellectual property and control over distribution networks.  The idea 
of a democratic culture stands as a critique of this emerging property-based 
conception.  That critique is crucial, because the architecture of the digital 
age and the law that governs distribution networks are up for grabs.  They 
can develop in many different ways, and the point is to ensure that they 
develop in the right ways. 
VIII 
THE JUDICIAL MODEL AND ITS LIMITATIONS 
To protect freedom of speech in the digital age, we will have to 
reinterpret and refashion both telecommunications policy and intellectual 
property law to serve the values of freedom of speech, which is to say, we 
will have to fashion and interpret them with the goals of a democratic 
culture in mind. 
How is this to be done?  I have argued that the digital age subtly alters 
our understanding of liberty of expression.  I believe it also changes how 
that liberty might be protected. 
Throughout the twentieth century, the most familiar method of 
protecting freedom of speech was through the judicial creation and 
protection of individual legal rights, and in particular, constitutional rights.  
Of course, when we look more closely, we will also discover many other 
features of public policy that promoted free speech values.  They include, 
among other things, free public education, the creation and maintenance of 
public libraries, a nationwide public mail system, subsidies for postage for 
books and publications by nonprofit organizations, the use of common 
carrier models for telephony, and national telecommunications policies that 
attempted to lower costs and increase access to radio and television.  For 
the most part, however, these policies have been regarded as largely 
peripheral to the main event—the judicial recognition and creation of 
doctrines that protect free speech rights from government censorship or 
other forms of government regulation. 
Indeed, the very success of the program of expanding individual free 
speech rights protected by courts made it an article of faith that this was 
how freedom of speech should be secured—through the judicial creation 
and protection of individual rights of free expression enforceable against 
state actors.  This notion has two important and distinct assumptions.  First, 
it assumes that one protects freedom of expression through protecting 
individual rights of free speech, rather than through creating systems of 
communication and information-sharing used by lots of people that 
facilitate free expression.  Put differently, it views the system of free 
expression as no more than the sum of all of the individual rights of free 
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expression.  Second, the model assumes that these individual rights will be 
created and protected primarily by courts, rather than by legislatures or 
administrative agencies, or, for that matter, by engineers, software 
designers, and technology companies. 
Nevertheless, the examples I mentioned earlier—free public 
education, free public libraries, common carrier rules in telephony, public 
interest rules in telecommunications, a public mail system, government 
subsidies for books and nonprofit publications, and so on—do not match 
these assumptions.  They are policies and institutions that promote a 
healthy and democratic system of free expression, but they are not 
composed of individual free speech rights.  Rather, they combine lots of 
different private rights with various government programs and entitlements, 
and in the case of telecommunications regulations, they may even include 
requirements for technological design.  Second, these features of the 
system of free expression are not always primarily created or protected by 
courts.  Rather, they are created by a number of parties, including 
legislatures and administrative agencies. 
The model of judicial protection of individual rights remains crucially 
important in the digital age.  But it will not be able to protect freedom of 
speech fully.  The digital age makes increasingly apparent what has always 
been the case—that the system of free expression relies on something more 
than the sum of all individual free speech rights.  It relies on a 
technological and regulatory infrastructure.  That infrastructure is produced 
through government regulation, through government subsidies and 
entitlement programs, and through technological design.  Freedom of 
speech is, and always has been, a cultural phenomenon as well as a legal or 
political one.  A healthy and well-functioning system of free expression 
depends on technologies of communication and a public ready and able to 
use those technologies to participate in the growth and development of 
culture. 
In the digital age, the technological and regulatory infrastructure that 
undergirds the system of free expression has become increasingly 
important.  Elements of the system of free expression that were 
backgrounded in the twentieth century will become foregrounded in the 
twenty-first.  They will be foregrounded, I argue, because the guarantee of 
a pure formal liberty to speak will increasingly be less valuable if 
technologies of communication and information storage are biased against 
widespread individual participation and toward the protection of property 
rights of media corporations.  If we place too much emphasis on judicial 
doctrine at the expense of infrastructure, we will be left with formal 
guarantees of speech embedded in technologies of control that frustrate 
their practical exercise. 
The system of free expression is produced through the synergy of (1) 
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government policies that promote popular participation in technologies of 
communication, (2) technological designs that facilitate decentralized 
control and popular participation rather than hinder them, and (3) the 
traditional recognition and enforcement of judicially created rights against 
government censorship.  The last of these—judicial creation and 
enforcement of rights of free speech against government abridgement—is 
the great achievement of the twentieth century.  Nevertheless, I believe that 
in the long run it will be recognized as only one leg of a three-legged stool 
that supports the system of free expression.  The other elements will 
increasingly move to the foreground of concern as it becomes clear that 
they are necessary to the promotion of a democratic culture. 
IX 
THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF FREE EXPRESSION:  FROM FREE SPEECH RIGHTS TO 
FREE SPEECH VALUES 
As the focus shifts from an exclusive concern with judicially protected 
individual constitutional rights to an additional concern with infrastructure, 
we must also shift our concern from free speech rights narrowly considered 
to free speech values.  Free speech rights are rights of individuals 
enforceable by courts.  Free speech values are values that we seek to 
promote through legislative and administrative regulation and through 
technological design. 
Protecting freedom of speech in the digital age means promoting a 
core set of values in legislation, administrative regulation, and the design of 
technology.  What are those values?  They are interactivity, broad popular 
participation, equality of access to information and communications 
technology, promotion of democratic control in technological design, and 
the practical ability of ordinary people to route around, glom on, and 
transform.  Free speech values include those aspects of liberty of 
expression that the digital age makes most salient:  popular participation, 
interactivity, and the encouragement and protection of cultural creativity 
and cultural transformation. 
Both technological architectures and legal regimes of regulation must 
be structured to make possible full and robust participation by individuals.  
Free speech values must enter both into the content of laws and the design 
of architectures of communication.  That is because the key forms of 
capital in the digital era—intellectual property and telecommunications 
networks—can serve both as conduits for increased democratic cultural 
participation or as chokepoints and bottlenecks, centralizing control in the 
hands of a relatively few persons and organizations.  What form 
informational capital will take, how it will be used, how it will be shared or 
if it will be shared at all, are the crucial questions of the digital age. 
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At stake in both intellectual property and telecommunications 
regulation is the question of democratic participation versus centralized 
control.  This is most obvious in the context of distribution networks:  The 
capitalist theory of free speech asserts the right of the owner of a 
communications network to control the flow of digital content through the 
network.  But the capitalist theory also seeks to expand intellectual 
property rights so that rights holders can control the distribution, use, and 
transformation of media products even after these products are distributed 
and sold to a mass audience.  The theory of free speech as democratic 
culture, by contrast, argues that both communications networks and 
intellectual property rights must facilitate broad cultural participation.  
Communications networks are public in nature even if their technological 
infrastructure is privately owned.  Therefore they must grant fair access to 
their networks, they must not act as chokepoints or bottlenecks, and they 
must not unfairly discriminate against content from other sources.  
Intellectual property rights must also serve democratic ends:  They exist to 
promote the spread of culture and possibilities for cultural innovation and 
transformation. 
To make intellectual property consistent with the idea of free speech 
as democratic culture, there must be a robust and ever expanding public 
domain with generous fair use rights.  Intellectual property also must not be 
permitted to create chokepoints or bottlenecks in the spread of knowledge 
and the distribution of culture. 
Judicial creation and protection of individual rights is ill equipped to 
deal with many of the most important problems of freedom of speech in the 
digital era.  Free speech values are often either promoted or hindered by the 
ways that technologies are designed and the ways that technological 
standards are set.  Technological designs and standards can let private 
parties become gatekeepers and bottlenecks controlling the flow of 
information and the scope of permissible innovation; or, conversely, they 
can promote widespread participation and innovation. 
Law has an important role to play here.  Laws affect how technology 
is designed, the degree of legal protection that a certain technology will 
enjoy, and whether still other technologies that modify or route around 
existing technological forms of distribution and control will be limited or 
forbidden.  But increasingly, these sorts of decisions will be made by 
legislatures and administrative agencies in consultation with private parties.  
Generally speaking, courts come to free speech controversies after 
technologies are already in place and deals between stakeholders have 
already been struck.  Courts can construe existing statutes to protect free 
speech values.  But in most cases they cannot easily order that particular 
new technologies or new standards be implemented.  They cannot easily 
hold, for example, that a certain technological design must be adopted.  
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They cannot insist that private companies refrain from using certain digital 
rights management technologies in return for a congressional statute that 
sets up a compulsory licensing scheme.  Courts can remand lower court and 
administrative agency decisions, but they cannot easily remand 
technologies to their designers and ask them to make the technology more 
free speech friendly.  Nor can they order or oversee the sort of 
comprehensive bargains that contemporary intellectual property regulation 
increasingly requires.  Those tasks will fall to other actors, with courts 
enforcing the legal bargains that are produced consistent with free speech 
values. 
The free speech values I have identified—participation, access, 
interactivity, democratic control, and the ability to route around and glom 
on—won’t necessarily be protected and enforced through judicial creation 
of constitutional rights.  Rather, they will be protected and enforced 
through the design of technological systems—code—and through 
legislative and administrative schemes of regulation, for example, through 
open access requirements or the development of compulsory license 
schemes in copyright law. 
This transforms the study of freedom of speech to the study of the 
design of architectures and regulatory systems.  It is no accident, I think, 
that many of the people who are at the forefront of the push for freedom in 
cyberspace are computer scientists, engineers, and software programmers, 
and it is no accident that lawyers who do cyberlaw spend an increasing 
amount of time thinking about technological and administrative solutions to 
civil rights issues.  That is because, as I have argued, free speech values are 
embedded both in administrative regulations and in technological design.  
To protect free speech in the digital age, lawyers have to become 
cyberlawyers,81 not simply lawyers who study cyberlaw, but lawyers who 
think about how technology can best be structured and how public policies 
can best be achieved through wise technological design.82 
CONCLUSION:  RIGHTS DYNAMISM 
I return to the question I posed at the beginning of this essay:  How 
should the theoretical justifications for freedom of speech change given the 
change in social conditions produced by the digital age? 
We can now offer an answer to this question.  Technological change 
presents new possibilities for freedom of expression, shows the value of 
free speech in a different light, and makes particular features of freedom of 
speech particularly salient.  These features include interactivity, mass 
 
 81 See Beth Simone Noveck, Designing Deliberative Democracy in Cyberspace:  The Role of 
the Cyber-Lawyer, 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 5, 8–10 (2003). 
 82 See, e.g., LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, supra note 17, at 3–8. 
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participation, nonexclusive appropriation, and creative transformation.  
This in turn leads us to a new conception of the purposes of freedom of 
speech, which I have called the promotion of a democratic culture. 
However, these same technological changes also create new forms of 
social conflict, as business interests try to protect new forms of capital 
investment.  This leads, in turn, to attempts to protect and expand rights in 
intellectual property and in the control of telecommunications networks.  
These rights claims clash with freedom of speech values in ever new ways; 
and the attempt to protect property rights in capital investment leads to 
competing visions of what freedom of speech is and what it is not. 
Finally, as technological innovation alters the social conditions of 
speech, the technological and legal infrastructure that supports the system 
of free expression becomes foregrounded.  As a result, free speech values 
must be articulated and protected in new ways, in particular, through the 
design of technology and through legislative and administrative regulation 
of technology, in addition to the traditional focus on judicial doctrines that 
protect constitutional rights. 
As the world changes around us, as the possibilities and problems of 
new technologies are revealed, our conception of the free speech principle 
begins to change with them.  Our sense of what freedom of speech is, why 
we value it, and how best to preserve that which we value, reframes itself 
in the changing milieu.  And as we respond to these changes, retracing our 
steps and rethinking our goals, we eventually come to understand what the 
free speech principle is about, and more importantly, what it always was 
about but only now can be adequately expressed.  That experience is not 
the experience of making something new.  It is the experience of finding 
something old, of recognizing principles and commitments already dimly 
understood, which suddenly are thrown into sharper focus by the alteration 
in our circumstances. 
The arguments in this essay are an outgrowth of a more general way 
of thinking about rights and fundamental liberties.  Call it a dynamic theory 
of rights, or rights dynamism.  Rights dynamism is the claim that the 
nature, scope, and boundaries of rights, and in particular fundamental rights 
like speech, are continually shifting with historical, political, economic, and 
technological changes in the world.83  The content and scope of those 
 
 83 For a more general account of legal historicism, of which dynamism is a special case, see 
Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Legal Historicism and Legal Academics:  The Roles of Law 
Professors in the Wake of Bush v. Gore, 90 GEO. L.J. 173, 174–75 (2001) (defining legal 
historicism as claim that legal conventions and forms of legal argument gradually change in 
response to political and social struggles that are waged through them).  See also PAUL BREST, 
SANFORD LEVINSON, J.M. BALKIN & AKHIL REED AMAR, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DECISIONMAKING, at xxxi–xxxii (4th ed. 2000) (articulating theory of constitutional historicism).  
I am using the term “dynamism” rather than historicism in order to emphasize two separate 
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rights, the interests they protect and the interests they leave unprotected, 
change as the language of rights and the enforcement of rights are placed in 
new contexts, and are invoked by different actors and different economic 
and social interests.  Hence it is necessary for those who believe in the 
language of rights—and in the recognition and protection of basic and 
fundamental rights such as the liberty of expression—to rethink the 
premises of rights as the discourse of rights is invoked in emerging social 
contexts.  For only through constant rethinking, in the face of changed 
circumstances, can we recall and rediscover what our deepest commitments 
truly are.  What appears to be change is actually continuity; what appears to 
be revision is actually the deepest form of remembrance. 
Most people, I suspect, will be wary of such historicism for an 
obvious reason.  If rights are truly fundamental, and therefore worth 
protecting and fighting for, their content should be relatively fixed over 
time.  We should not alter what is protected and what is not protected every 
time we come across a result we do not like, for if the content and scope of 
basic liberties can change, and if they must be retheorized and 
reconceptualized in each generation, who is to say that they will not be 
eroded, undermined, or effectively destroyed?  Even if we only set out to 
change our attitudes about these basic rights at the margins, jettisoning 
some elements and adding others, who is to say that we will not throw out 
the baby with the bathwater?  What security do we have in rights that can 
change as history changes? 
I do not underestimate these worries, or the force of these concerns.  
They describe a great danger for liberty.  They articulate the threat that all 
historicism (and all relativism) present to principle and to principled 
argument.  But here is the catch.  If we do not, from time to time, rethink 
the scope and extension of our basic liberties, their scope and extension 
will change anyway, whether we like it or not.  For faced as we are with 
social, technological, and economic change, other people will be busily 
rewriting rights and turning them to their own advantage.  And if we do 
nothing to contest their work in an altered environment, we will soon find 
ourselves living with a set of fundamental rights framed and shaped 
according to their interests and their agendas. 
Rights are a form of discourse, a way of thinking about the needs of 
social order and human liberty in the context of a changing world.  Rights 
are also a source of power—first, because they are a powerful form of 
 
points:  First, rights dynamism is internal to participants in the practice of rights discourse rather 
than a stance that merely studies the discourse from the outside with no particular stake in its 
outcome.  Second, rights dynamism is forward-looking, concerned with the future of a practice 
whose full contours cannot be known in advance, rather than a backward-looking historicism that 
attempts to articulate and comprehend changes that occurred in the distant past. 
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rhetorical appeal, and second, because the enforcement of rights recognized 
by the state is backed up the power of the state.  Because of this, rights and 
rights discourse are continually invoked by people and by groups to further 
their ideals, interests, and agendas: For the discourse of rights is the 
discourse of power, the restructuring of rights is the restructuring of power, 
and the securing of rights is the securing of power. 
As people face new problems and altered circumstances, they 
naturally invoke elements of existing rights discourses, hoping to extend 
them in preferred directions in order to articulate their moral and political 
ends and further their favored policies.  They call upon the struggles and 
victories of the past and the legal concepts of the present in order to shape 
the future.  This is as true of groups and interests we like as those we 
oppose. 
Rights are not simply a fixed set of protections that the state affords or 
fails to afford.  Rights are a terrain of struggle in a world of continuous 
change—a site of ongoing controversies, a battleground where the shape 
and contours of the terrain are remade with each victory.  Rights, and 
particularly fundamental rights, far from being fixed and immovable, are 
moving targets.  They are worth fighting over because the discourse of 
rights has power and because that discourse can be reshaped and is 
reshaped through intellectual debate and political struggle. 
This feature of rights discourse is a special case of what I have called 
“ideological drift.”  The liberty of expression has no special security from 
such drift.  To the contrary, it is subject to the pushing and pulling, the 
reconceptualizations and transvaluations to which all other rights are heir.  
The capitalist theory of rights that I have described previously is only the 
most recent example. 
If one loves liberty, and believes that there are basic liberties that 
every decent society should recognize and protect, one must also recognize 
that the rhetorical reconstruction of rights will be ongoing whether we or 
others perform it.  What we do not do for ourselves will surely be done to 
us. 
Eternal vigilance, it is often said, is the price of liberty.  But that 
vigilance is of two forms.  The first kind of vigilance is the vigilance of the 
guardian, who attempts to ensure that every feature and aspect of liberty is 
preserved today just as it was in ages past.  But the second and far more 
important form of vigilance is the vigilance of the guide or explorer, who 
helps others make the transition from the world they knew to the one that 
awaits them. 
People are continually thrown into new circumstances and they must 
articulate the meaning of liberty in those new circumstances.  The task of 
such a guide or explorer is to find the meaning of the old in the new, and to 
prevent the rhetoric of liberty from becoming liberty’s prison.  Such 
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vigilance is every bit as important as the vigilance of the guardian.  And 
this vigilance, too, is eternal, and its exercise, too, is the ineluctable price of 
liberty.  The world will not stand still and let us enjoy our freedoms.  It will 
continually make itself anew, and as it does, we must consider the ever-
changing predicament of liberty, and the ever new methods by which it 
may be augmented or curtailed. 
The digital revolution is a revolution, and like all revolutions, it is a 
time of confusion, a time of transition, and a time of opportunity for 
reshaping the structures of the economy and the sources of power.  As a 
time of opportunity it is also a time of opportunism, a period in which the 
meaning of liberty of expression will be determined for good or for ill, just 
as the meaning of economic liberty was determined in an earlier age.  Make 
no mistake:  The digital age will change the meaning of freedom of 
expression.  The only question is how it will change.  If we do not 
reconsider the basis of liberty in this age, if we do not possess the vigilance 
of the guide as well as the guard, we shall end up like every person who 
travels through the wilderness without a compass, or through the forest 
without the forester.  We shall end up lost. 
